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Model(ing) Privacy: Empirical Approaches to Privacy Law & 
Governance 
By Lindsey Barrett 
Privacy can be difficult for people to conceptualize, including for 
the policymakers charged with designing, interpreting, and enforcing 
privacy law. In both consumer privacy law and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the privacy protections afforded to individuals are 
shaped by the ability of governmental decision-makers to assess 
privacy preferences, expectations, and behaviors, which they are 
rarely in a position to do accurately.  While policymakers can have a 
hard time understanding the subtle factors influencing privacy 
decision-making or parsing seemingly contradictory privacy 
incentives, it is an area where new empirical approaches have begun 
to excel. Researchers have used empirical techniques like machine 
learning, natural language processing, and crowdsourcing to explain 
the complexities of privacy decision-making, and to illustrate the 
nuances of privacy preferences, expectations, and behaviors that many 
opinion surveys often fail to grasp. Recent work has focused on 
eliciting privacy norms through crowdsourcing, modeling individual 
privacy preferences and expectations using machine learning, 
extracting key terms from privacy policies through natural language 
processing, and modeling AI assistants based on context and user 
preferences to predict (or nudge) future decisions. Modeling privacy 
preferences, expectations and behavior can provide judges, regulators, 
and legislators with a more accurate and nuanced sense of privacy 
norms for future cases and policy discussions. Encouraging the 
implementation of proactive privacy tools, such as automated 
annotation of privacy policies and nudging assistants, can help bridge 
the gap separating user expectations, user behavior, and how both are 
understood under existing laws. While the use of this research in 
privacy law and policy cannot fundamentally transform the structural 
flaws that skew regulators’ perceptions of societal norms, it can at least 
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correct the worst of those excesses, and facilitate policy that reflects 
how people actually think about privacy in the modern age. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
“The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans 
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They 
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the 
most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized 
men.”  
- Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting, Olmstead v. United States1 
 
“Your user agreement sucks.” 
                                                          
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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- Senator John Kennedy to Mark Zuckerberg, Senate Judiciary 
Hearing on Facebook, Social Media, Privacy, and the Use and Abuse 
of Data2 
 
People care about privacy for different reasons, and to differing 
extents. As the volume of data sets about each of us continues to 
proliferate, and the uses of that information continue to evolve, gauging 
individual privacy expectations and broader societal norms has become 
increasingly challenging. Individuals make privacy decisions that seem 
to undermine their stated preferences, even as the risks to the 
fundamental interests linked to privacy, such as equality, autonomy, 
and intellectual freedom, only continue to grow. Largely to blame for 
these apparent contradictions are the ineffective standards that 
determine how privacy decision-making, expectations, and preferences 
are measured. The regulatory regime governing consumer privacy and 
the Fourth Amendment’s protections for privacy from the government 
both rest on the idea that judges and policymakers can discern 
individual and collective privacy norms, when in reality, they are rarely 
able to do so accurately.  
Consumer privacy law in the United States is molded around the 
idea of privacy as an economic good, where the degree of legal 
protection a person receives depends on her control over her 
information through notice and choice mechanisms, like app 
permissions or privacy policies. The notice and choice model relies on 
the idea that informing consumers in convoluted boilerplate of how 
their data is collected and used empowers them to make privacy 
decisions that reflect their preferences. Under this thinking, any failure 
to subsequently make privacy-protective choices indicates either 
apathy or a deliberate declaration of a contrary preference. In fact, it is 
exceedingly difficult for individuals to make choices that produce the 
privacy outcomes they prefer or expect due to cognitive and structural 
limitations. Phenomena like decision fatigue, learned helplessness, and 
lack of information about collection and tracking all impede 
individuals from making the privacy choices that correspond to what 
they hope (or believe) will happen to their information. 
 Many technologies have become so intertwined with daily life 
that even individuals with strong privacy preferences or expectations 
cannot make choices that suit those preferences. A person might want 
to avoid geolocational tracking but need to carry a cell phone to ensure 
an elderly parent can get in touch; someone else might wish to avoid 
                                                          
2 Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018) 
https://perma.cc/Y7E3-PN5P. 
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web tracking but be required to use a school or employer-run Gmail 
account. In a memorable example, journalist Julia Angwin documented 
her attempts to avoid every form of surveillance she could by using 
burner phones whenever possible, abstaining from using any Google 
services, relying on a credit card under a fake name when she couldn’t 
use cash, and carrying her smartphone in a makeshift Faraday bag to 
block the phone from sending or receiving signals.3 She assessed her 
diligent efforts to avoid being tracked as “50% successful” – and this 
is a tech-savvy investigative journalist, who was solely dedicated to the 
task of protecting her privacy.4 Others may have stronger privacy 
preferences or expectations repudiated by the actions of others that are 
beyond their control. In a recent and infamous example, Facebook 
provided the information of 87 million users to the political firm 
Cambridge Analytica, which then coordinated with the Trump 
campaign to target voters based on that data.5 The firm acquired the 
information after just 30,000 users downloaded a quiz app, and 
Facebook’s developer guidelines allowed the firm to access the data 
from every Facebook friend the quiz app users had. While users 
consent to a lot of things when they create a Facebook account, it is 
difficult to argue that the 86,970,000 users who did not download the 
app themselves expected their information to be used for voter 
targeting by a presidential campaign (or even that the 30,000 who did 
download the app would expect that result). Data breach after data 
breach further demonstrates that while companies may promise to 
protect their users’ data in their privacy policy, they consistently fail to 
do so.6 Chief Justice Roberts noted in Carpenter v. United States, this 
country of 326 million individuals is a country of 396 million cell 
phone accounts, and only the few without phones can escape such 
“tireless and absolute surveillance.”7 
Despite the enormous barriers to making choices that cohere with 
an individual’s privacy expectations or preferences, the failure of 
individuals to make privacy-protective decisions is repeatedly declared 
                                                          
3 Jacob Silverman, ‘Dragnet Nation’ Looks at the Hidden Systems that Are Always Looking at 
You, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://perma.cc/3J4C-HQUS. 
4 Andrew Leonard, Is Privacy Really Dead? Julia Angwin and the Quest to Escape Big Brother, 
SALON (Mar. 2, 2014, 9:00 PM), https://perma.cc/UB7Y-GDDH. 
5 Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout 
Widens, N.Y.T. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-
cambridge-analytica-explained.html. 
6 2017 saw a record high of 1,579 breaches, a 44.7% increase from the year before. More than 
half of these breaches involved Social Security numbers, with a total of nearly 158 million 
exposed. 2017 Annual Data Breach Year-End Review, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 
https://perma.cc/Y5C8-TKEQ (last visited July 30, 2018). 
7 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , No. 16-402, slip op. at 1, 14 (U.S. June 22, 2018). 
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to be evidence that people do not care about their privacy, or to the 
extent that they do care, they do not care enough. In addition to leaving 
individual privacy at the mercy of broken mechanisms, the inefficacy 
of notice and choice warps privacy narratives in public policy by 
allowing non-privacy-protective behavior to be attributed to a 
conscious rejection by the marketplace. This lets a failed system 
masquerade as evidence of democratic consensus on permissive 
regulation. Motivated analysis of opinion surveys that measure privacy 
preferences, expectations, and behavior in an a contextual and leading 
manner further bolsters broad claims that most individuals care less 
about their privacy than they do about receiving goods and services for 
it, and that regulators should respond accordingly.8 In a country where 
consumer privacy is considered a good to trade away and where 
consumer privacy is constantly juxtaposed against the primacy of 
American innovation, strong legal protections are easy to portray as 
stilted, counterproductive, and even undemocratic.9 As regulators and 
legislators attempt to craft policy that reflects the will of the people 
they serve, this hijacked narrative continues to provide support for 
privacy governance that fails to protect privacy, including claims that 
permissive laws or self-regulation are the result that the public, rather 
than industry, truly wants. 
In criminal law, the Fourth Amendment at least sets a textual 
threshold of a right to privacy. But the enforcement of that right also 
depends on a judge’s understanding of what a reasonable expectation 
of privacy is,10 and her application of common-law doctrines to new 
technological contexts. Here, too, misunderstanding of privacy 
preferences, expectations and behaviors leads to weaker protections for 
privacy, as a judge’s perception of what a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is tends to differ from that of the average person.11 
Furthermore, as Justice Alito put it, “judges are apt to confuse their 
own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable 
person to which the Katz test looks.”12 Demographics may also play a 
part. Judges are older, whiter, more likely to be male, and better 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., Association of National Advertisers, Comment Letter on Protecting the Privacy of 
Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, at 11 (May 31, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/YS3Y-2TVV (hereinafter, ANA Comments). 
9 See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO L. J. 
115, 132 (2017) (describing the “marketplace discourse” of privacy in the United States). 
10 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
11 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L. J. 727, 732 (1993). 
12 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
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educated than is the average defendant.13 The judiciary is also more 
likely to be aware of technological risks,14 less likely to have had 
personal interactions with the criminal justice system,15 and likely to 
overestimate the average person’s understanding of how privacy and 
surveillance works.16 Whatever the combination of factors, judges tend 
to believe that the public holds a lower expectation of privacy than the 
public itself reports.17  
One example of the space between the judge’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy and that of the average person is the recent 
landmark privacy case, Carpenter v. United States.18 The Supreme 
Court held that the government must obtain a warrant before obtaining 
seven or more days of cell site location information (CSLI) from a 
third-party service provider, in lieu of extending the third-party 
doctrine’s principle that the defendant had assumed the risk (and 
extinguished any reasonable expectation of privacy) that law 
enforcement might obtain the information by entrusting it to the 
company.19 But the logic of the holding depends on both the duration 
of the tracking, and the fact that the data collected was geolocational.20 
Other kinds of information transmitted through third parties – which, 
in the modern age, is nearly all the information we interact with – may 
still be accessed without a warrant. While the decision is an important 
                                                          
13 See Bernard Chao, Catherine S. Durso, Ian P. Farrell & Christopher T. Robertson, Why Courts 
Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology, 106 CAL. L. REV. 263, 290 (2018) 
(noting that the judiciary tends to be more male, white, affluent and educated than ordinary 
members of the public); Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. 
U. L. REV. 139, 170 (2016). 
14 See Tokson, supra note 13, at 169-70 (observing that knowledge about technology tends to 
reach more highly educated people, and that judges are both more highly educated than average, 
and more likely to be better acquainted with both government surveillance and criminal 
procedure). 
15 See Chao et al., supra note 13, at 289-291 (discussing the prior literature on how demographics 
impact judicial perceptions, noting that the judiciary skews more male, white, educated, and older 
than the American population at large, and the relatively high rates of imprisonment and lower 
representation on the state and federal bench for African-Americans and Hispanics). 
16 Tokson, supra note 13, at 172 (“[J]udges are well-informed socioeconomic elites who are likely 
to systematically overestimate societal knowledge. Societal knowledge tends to be 
counterintuitively low, and tends to spread more quickly to elites than to the average citizen.”) 
(citations omitted). See, e.g., id. at 174 (distinguishing the high level of understanding courts 
consider the average person to have of surveillance and web tracking from the average person’s 
actual understanding of those technologies, which tends to be limited). 
17 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 11, at 731 (describing the evolution of the “societal 
understanding” of privacy norms as a function of the Katz test). 
18 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , No. 16-402, slip op. at 12-13 (U.S. June 22, 2018). 
19 Id. at 11. 
20 Id. at 18 (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question 
conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other 
business records that might incidentally reveal location information.”). 
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step towards updating the Fourth Amendment for the digital age, it’s 
unlikely this distinction aligns with how most people think about the 
sensitivity of their information. In one study, 90% of participants 
believed that police should have to at least obtain a warrant before 
accessing the email addresses they had corresponded with, whereas 
only 55-60% believed that a warrant should be required for their 
geolocation information, and few varied in their answer according to 
the duration of the geolocation tracking.21 Carpenter’s protection for 
information relayed through third parties rests on factors that people 
care less about, as opposed to the kinds of information (like email 
addresses) left unprotected by the decision.  
While Carpenter provided a rare glimmer of hope for those who 
wish to see a Fourth Amendment that fully grapples with the breadth 
and depth of technological change, most judicial attempts to apply 
analog doctrines to digital technology frequently ignore the extent to 
which the new context undermines the logic underlying older 
doctrines. Areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence like the third-
party doctrine, the public view doctrine, and the content/non-content 
distinction insufficiently consider the role of context in privacy 
decision-making, and have been rendered inapt by technological 
realities.22 For example, the majority’s declination to extend the third-
party doctrine to CSLI rested on the particular sensitivity of 
geolocation information, given that cellphones accompany their 
owners everywhere, in contrast with a car.23 But modern vehicles come 
equipped with GPS and the ability to sync with the driver’s phone; 
some even receive their connectivity from the same cell towers that 
collect CSLI, all while being subject to warrantless access by law 
enforcement under the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception.24 
The result is a privacy right tethered to the reasonable judge’s 
expectation of privacy rather than that of the reasonable person, and 
doctrines that fail to provide the Constitutional guarantees of privacy 
they were designed to give. 
This article does not intend to imply that consumer and criminal 
privacy law work in the same way, or are hobbled by identical 
deficiencies. The principles, objectives, and constraints of consumer 
                                                          
21 Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require 
Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 20, 52-54 (2015). 
22 See infra Part II(b)(ii). 
23 Carpenter, slip op. at 13. 
24 Lindsey Barrett, Herbie, Fully Downloaded: Data-Driven Vehicles and the Automobile 
Exception, 106 GEO L. J. 182, 185-187 (2017) (describing the tracking and collection capacities 
of connected cars and arguing that the privacy interest in the information they collect merits the 
use of a warrant). 
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privacy law and Fourth Amendment law are different, as are the 
institutional competencies of the governmental decision-makers 
creating and applying the law. Consumer privacy regulators must be 
able to accurately deduce privacy norms and apply them to legal 
standards, as a judge does. But they also use their understanding of 
norms to determine the fundamental level of protection consumers will 
receive from proactive policy measures, whether through enforcement 
actions, regulation, public education, or incentive programs. Correctly 
assessing privacy norms in a market-based privacy model is crucial, as 
there is no theoretical floor of what protections consumer privacy 
should receive. A narrative informed by a mistaken faith in 
economically rational privacy decision-making or misleading opinion 
surveys can impact how legislators and regulators view their 
obligations to the public.  
In comparison, privacy in criminal law as guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment does have a fundamental floor, namely the 
Constitutional right the Framers provided for privacy.25 But that too is 
ensured by a judge’s understanding of societal expectations of privacy, 
when their experiences and perspectives rarely reflect those of the 
average person. Judges applying the law based on an accurate 
understanding of societal privacy norms is a fundamental component 
of ensuring that the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” reflects what the average reasonable person would expect.26 
Moreover, consumer privacy and Fourth Amendment privacy have 
become increasingly interdependent as the vast amounts of data that 
companies collect and store become the vast amounts of evidence the 
government can access. The myth of the rational privacy decision-
maker in consumer privacy is also highly relevant to many Fourth 
Amendment doctrines.  
In both areas of the law, the amount of privacy the law guarantees 
depends in large measure on how a person makes privacy decisions, 
given the information society expects them to have.27 And while the 
failure of notice and choice as an effective data control mechanism 
facilitates companies’ ability to collect data that can be accessed by law 
enforcement, permissive privacy regulation gives them little reason to 
                                                          
25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
26 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
27 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Carpenter, 585 U.S. ___ (No. 16-402) (2018) 
(Alito, J.) (“Well, I mean, that's a debatable empirical point whether people realize [that the cell 
phones companies are storing records of their movements], and there's reason to think maybe they 
do . . . . The contract, the standard MetroPCS contract seems to … advise the customer that we 
can disclose this information to the government if we get a court order. So I don't know whether 
that will hold up.”).  
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restrain themselves. The technologies that are primarily regulated by 
consumer law are the instrumentalities of the surveillance the Fourth 
Amendment protects against. This article discusses both areas of the 
law to highlight those interdependencies and because the research 
discussed infra can be a valuable tool for judges and regulators alike in 
understanding the privacy norms that they often struggle to accurately 
interpret. 
Computer science researchers have begun to attack the problem 
of understanding privacy norms with research that empirically 
measures privacy behavior and preferences, and which more heavily 
focuses on the role of context and other non-normative factors on 
privacy decision-making, such as by deducing preferences through 
modeling user behavior, or by training predictive models on 
crowdsourced answers to context-focused privacy vignettes. Empirical 
evidence on privacy norms already plays a role in shaping consumer 
privacy policy at the agency level, largely through opinion surveys. But 
the role of empirical evidence in privacy policy and judicial decision-
making can be expanded and improved to better measure how people 
feel about their privacy, and why. In consumer privacy, where legal 
protections hinge on individuals’ control of their information and 
regulators’ perception of the norms their actions create, it is crucial to 
parse privacy expectations, preferences, and behavior, and to 
understand the barriers hindering consumers from making privacy 
decisions that reflect their preferences and expectations. Regulators 
would benefit from analyzing and incentivizing research that 
acknowledges the impact of those barriers and the role of context in 
privacy decision-making, particularly in lieu of broadly framed opinion 
surveys that ignore the existence of either. In Fourth Amendment law, 
the use of empirical research to guide governmental decision-making 
is much less common; empirical research on privacy norms could help 
correct judges’ erroneous understanding of what a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is, and to consider how blunt precedents should 
be applied to new technology. 
Though deeply flawed, the existing legal standards governing 
privacy in the United States are unlikely to change in a fundamental 
way anytime soon. The reasonable expectation of privacy test is a 
foundational pillar of Fourth Amendment doctrine, and notice and 
choice is equally inextricable from consumer privacy law. But as long 
as the degree of privacy protection a consumer is afforded depends 
primarily on engaging with notice and choice mechanisms, regulators 
need to understand how and why privacy decision-making fails to 
represent the outcomes consumers intend. As long as the Fourth 
Amendment rests on a judge’s perception of societal norms and 
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applying analog precedent to technologies that undermine the 
principles upon which they were based, judges need a more accurate 
understanding of the average person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and the extent to which technology shifts the applicability of 
older precedents to the modern day. A more empirically accurate 
approach to how those standards measures privacy norms could help 
straighten misguided narratives, restore weakened protections, and 
update basic policy assumptions that have grown obsolete.  
This article will proceed in five parts. The first part will provide 
an overview of consumer and criminal privacy laws and the respective 
deficiencies of each that have resulted in misinterpretation of privacy 
preferences, expectations, behaviors, and norms by judges and 
regulators. The second will address the role of context in privacy 
decision-making and in Fourth Amendment doctrine. The third will 
provide an overview on relevant empirical privacy research, and 
discuss new research that uses machine learning, crowdsourcing, and 
natural language processing to provide an empirical basis for 
understanding privacy preferences, expectations, behaviors, and 
norms, as well as methods of operationalizing user preferences and 
expectations to make privacy decision-making more coherent. The 
fourth part will address the applications of that research in consumer 
and criminal law, recognizing the institutional competences and 
limitations of different branches of government in how empirical 
evidence may be used. The fifth part will address additional 
considerations, and the sixth will conclude. 
I. PRIVACY NORMS & THE LAW 
A. Consumer Privacy 
As the United States lacks an omnibus privacy law, consumer 
privacy is protected through a fractal array of sector-specific statutes at 
the state and federal levels.28 The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects the privacy of health 
information;29 the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) 
protects the privacy of genetic information;30 the Family Education 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) covers educational information;31 
                                                          
28 See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 14 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 989, 990 nn.1-5 (2012) (detailing sector-specific privacy statutes); Lorrie 
Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Notice and Choice, 10 
J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 277 (2012). 
29 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2017). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5 (2012). 
31 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). 
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children’s privacy is protected by the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA);32 financial privacy is protected under the 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)33 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA);34 the Privacy Act of 1974 provides protections for 
information held by the federal government.35 Other laws, prompted by 
sporadic public uproar over individual events, protect varied forms of 
information like video rental records under the Video Privacy 
Protection Act (VPPA),36 or state driver’s licenses under the Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act (DPPA).37  
Each of these is heavily influenced or directly predicated on the 
Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), a framework of privacy 
governance principles that became the global touchstone of privacy 
regulation. First mentioned in a report from the U.S. Department of 
Health and Welfare, the FIPPs became more influential after being 
formalized in a report from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1980.38 The FIPPs, 
particularly the collection limitation principle and the use limitation 
principle, emphasize the informational control of the user and spurred 
the development of notice and choice as a bedrock privacy safeguard 
in privacy law and policy.39 Federal and state privacy statutes allow 
different treatment of information based on whether the data-collecting 
entity obtains consent.40 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the 
United States’ de facto data protection agency, has applied its 
deception authority under the FTC Act to privacy policies and promises 
by bringing enforcement actions against companies that obtain consent 
through a policy that is contrary or silent as to the actual practices of 
                                                          
32 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012). 
33 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). 
34 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
35 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
36 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012). 
38 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES ON 
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980). 
39 See Rebecca Balebako, Cristian Bravo-Lillo & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Is Notice Enough: 
Mitigating the Risks of Smartphone Data Sharing, 11 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 279, 
281-82 (2015) (describing the development of the Fair Information Practice Principles, and noting 
that only one, Integrity/Security, focuses solely on the data collector, rather than the information 
control of the subject); CHRISTOPHER HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW 
AND POLICY 152-53 (2016) (describing the FIPs as the “basis for virtually all information privacy 
regulation”).  
40 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and The Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1880, 1880 (2013) (“Consent legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of 
personal data.”). 
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the company.41 Notice and choice, particularly through privacy 
policies, is broadly understood to be the fundamental basis of the 
agency’s privacy philosophy and an integral component of its policy 
toolkit.42  
The primacy of notice and choice in consumer privacy law makes 
individual privacy decision-making the bellwether of privacy 
protection in the consumer sphere. How a user understands the privacy 
decisions she make, and a regulator’s interpretation of those 
motivations is fundamental. The idea that providing an individual with 
notice of a company’s practices, and choice over whether or not to use 
the service after being provided with information about those practices, 
is the foundational safeguard that a data-collecting entity should 
provide.43 But while the notion of privacy as informational control is 
the foundation establishing consumer privacy law, it is as ineffective 
as it would be difficult to replace.44 Critics have long challenged FIPPs 
on the basis that notice and choice merely confers an illusion of control, 
and that it reduces privacy compliance to check-the-box formalism 
with no real consumer guarantees.45 The ever-expanding network of 
Internet of things (IoT) devices also makes notice and choice 
increasingly less workable from a practical standpoint.46 How and 
                                                          
41 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L. 
& POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 543, 545-48 (2008) (describing the development of the FTC’s approach 
to privacy policies and enforcing unfair and deceptive practices); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow 
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2014)  
(describing the FTC’s entry into privacy enforcement). 
42 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (June 1998) (describing 
notice as the “fundamental” basis of the FTC’s privacy approach). See also Solove & Hartzog, 
supra note 41, at 634 (describing notice and choice as the “central” aspect of the agency’s work). 
Cf. Joel Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russel, Alexander J. Callen, Sophia Qasir & Thomas B. Norton, 
Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y 
FOR INFO SOC’Y 485, 491 (describing the failures of the notice and choice mechanisms). 
43 Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 
952, 952-53 (2017). 
44 Id. at 953-54; Solove, supra note 40, at 1880-82 (describing the cognitive and structural 
limitations hampering the efficacy of notice and choice as a method of effective privacy 
management, and noting that the solution that sufficiently grapples with the consent-based model 
remains “elusive”). 
45 See Hartzog, supra note 43, at 953 n.1 (detailing critiques of the FIPs since their inception); 
Julie Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20.1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming 
2019) (“notice-and-consent protections, which function as the principal regulatory tool in the U.S. 
system and as an increasingly important backstop in the European system, simply do not work.”). 
46 See Hosub Lee & Alfred Kobsa, Privacy Preference Modeling and Prediction in a Simulated 
Campuswide IoT Environment, 2017 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECRONICS ENGINEERS  INT’L CONF. 
ON PERVASIVE COMPUTING & COMM. 276, 276 (2017) (describing the difficulty of designing 
effective notice and choice mechanisms for IOT devices); Hartzog, supra note 43, at 953 (Hartzog 
describes the evolving risks that have made the FIPPs increasingly obsolete, including that “[t]he 
mass connectivity of the ‘Internet of Things’ and near ubiquity of mobile devices make the 
security and surveillance risks presented by the isolated computer terminals and random CCTV 
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when can a device provide substantive information about the 
company’s data practices when the user is driving a connected car or if 
the interface of the device is too small to easily read? Other IoT devices 
with outward-facing sensors may also have to grapple with novel third-
party consent problems.47 Notice and choice has been the whipping boy 
of privacy scholars and advocates for a reason – it has not worked, and 
it will only continue to fail consumers as new forms of interactive, 
networked technology advance and spread. 
1. Framing Privacy 
Not only does notice and choice fail to provide consumers with a 
reliable way to manage their information, but the consumers’ inability 
to meaningfully engage with privacy policies and permissions settings 
is one of the most frequently cited indications that individuals care very 
little about their privacy.48 It is the symptom that is not only killing the 
patient, but also mistakenly convinces the doctor that the condition is 
benign rather than severe, compounding the damage the symptom itself 
inflicts. The prevalence of individual privacy behavior that is 
inconsistent with expressed preferences has given rise to the so-called 
“privacy paradox,” which concludes that an individual’s behavior that 
is less privacy-protective than their expressed preferences reveals a true 
preference against privacy in favor of other values, such as 
convenience, efficiency, or economic gain.49 While the privacy 
                                                          
cameras of the ‘80s and ‘90s seem quaint.”); Pardis Emami-Naeini, Sruti Bhagavatula, Hana 
Habib, Martin Degeling, Lujo Bauer, Lorrie Faith Cranor & Norman Sadeh, Privacy Expectations 
and Preferences in an IoT World, 2017 SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 399, 400  
(noting the additional challenges that IOT devices pose for the notice and choice model, such as 
“obtaining consent for data collection, allowing users to control, customize, and choose the data 
they share, and ensuring the use of collected data is limited to the stated purpose”). 
47 See, e.g., Cara Bloom, Joshua Tran, Javed Ramjohn & Lujo Bauer, Self-Driving Cars and Data 
Collection: Privacy Perceptions of Networked Autonomous Vehicles, 2017 SYMP. ON USABLE 
PRIVACY & SECURITY 357, 361 (noting that few legal protections apply to the collection of data 
belonging to third parties, such as data collected by automotive sensors). 
48 See, e.g., Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Measuring Privacy: An Empirical Test Using 
Context to Expose Confounding Variables, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 176, 180 (2016) 
(describing the conflict between reported privacy preferences and privacy behavior, and the so-
called “privacy paradox”); Caleb S. Fuller, The Perils of Privacy Regulation, 30 REV. AUSTRIAN 
ECON. 193, 197 (2017) (“Third, some appear puzzled by the lack of privacy protection that 
contracts provide. Yet, might the absence of such protection be evidence that consumers do not 
value it highly?”). 
49 Idris Adjerid, Eyal Peer & Alessandro Acquisti, Beyond the Privacy Paradox: Objective versus 
Relative Risk in Privacy Decision Making, 42 MGMT. INFO. SYS. Q. 465, 469-470 (2018) (defining 
the privacy paradox and outlining the accompanying literature); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY 
IN CONTEXT TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 104-5 (2010) 
(describing the privacy paradox). See, e.g., Alan McQuinn, The Economics of “Opt-Out” Versus 
“Opt-In” Privacy Rules, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION (October 6, 
2017), https://perma.cc/B2UH-GPD8 (citing several studies that asked survey respondents 
14 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 35 
paradox’s diagnosis is incorrect, the existence of the symptoms it 
attempts to analyze is well-supported. People tend to assert that they 
value privacy in opinion surveys, but they nevertheless take advantage 
of free products and services in exchange for providing their 
information50 or fail to take advantage of safeguards for their privacy, 
such as reading privacy policies,51 rejecting privacy-invasive user 
settings, or failing to affirmatively choose privacy-protective user 
settings. In one study that ranked the privacy attitudes of participants 
as high, medium, or low concern, only 46% of the high concern group 
had informed themselves of the existence or content of a monitoring 
policy at their school or workplace, and 41% of that same group 
reported their frequency of reading privacy policies as “rare.”52 This is 
logically inconsistent, but it invites a far wider range of conclusions 
than simply deciding that actions must speak louder than words, and 
that the validity of expressed preferences is vitiated by contradictory 
behavior.  
The Senate hearing in response to Facebook sharing 87 million 
users’ data with Cambridge Analytica without their consent provides a 
recent example of how this logic is often employed.53 As Senator Ron 
Johnson questioned Mark Zuckerberg about user responses to 
revelations that the social media had shared their information, 
Zuckerberg said that he had not seen a “dramatic falloff” of users 
leaving the platform. Johnson replied, “But it seems like Facebook 
users still want to use the platform because they enjoy sharing photos 
and they share the connectivity with family members, that type of 
thing. And that overrides their concerns about privacy.”54 This logic 
ignores the fact that Facebook, like many other technologies that create 
collateral privacy risks, offers a service that may be impractical or 
impossible for users to fully extricate themselves from, whether 
because it is the only way to communicate with family members, 
crucial for publicizing a small business, or any of the other needs that 
                                                          
whether they would pay for the privacy they already received for free, and concluding that the 
only reason why public opinion polls claim to support strong privacy legislation “is because these 
surveys rarely confront consumers with the price consequences of their choices,” and claiming 
that as regulation would require consumers to pay more for privacy, they would not actually 
support strong privacy legislation despite saying that they do.). 
50 See Nissenbaum, supra note 49, at 105. 
51 See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 41, at 550; Solove, supra note 40, at 1884.  
52 Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision 
Making, 3 INST. ELECTRIC & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS SECURITY & PRIVACY 26, 28 (2005). 
53 See Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 115th Cong. 
(2018). 
54 Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, supra note 2. 
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technology companies have worked hard to fill.55 For the many valid 
concerns the Cambridge Analytica debacle may have given users about 
their privacy, users may have equally convincing reasons not to leave 
the platform, all of which the Senator (and those who would employ 
similar logic) ignores.56  
Similarly, in a report criticizing privacy opinion surveys and their 
role in policymaking, Jim Harper and Solveig Simpleton note that 
despite many surveys reporting a high level of respondent “concern” 
about giving out credit card information or social security numbers 
online, consumers still do so, which they conclude is a clear indication 
that the reported concerns are false.57 This is an extreme example of 
privacy paradox myopia, as there is a wide range of goods, services, 
and opportunities that can only practically be acquired by submitting 
those numbers over the Internet, and the fact that consumers are able 
and willing to do so has enabled the same vibrant Internet economy 
that the authors otherwise champion. The vast majority of government 
benefits also require applicants and recipients to disclose their social 
security number – many of these have online portals, which a person 
might use despite a privacy concern out of convenience or necessity, 
like a disability benefit recipient who is unable to use a phone.58 The 
rationale of the privacy paradox is simplistic, and it assumes a causal 
connection between preference and behavior without accounting for 
the factors that separate hypothesized cause from observable effect.  
Some surveys attempt to infer apathy from inconsistency, while 
others simply frame their questions to elicit desired answers. One such 
study conducted in 2016 by the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA), 
an umbrella organization of advertising trade groups, purported to 
                                                          
55 See Aja Romano, How Facebook Made It Impossible to Delete Facebook, VOX (March 22, 
2018, 2:00 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/5ZN9-FSDV. 
56 See id. See also April Glaser, The Problem With #DeleteFacebook, SLATE (March 21, 2018, 
3:46 PM) https://perma.cc/EP62-UASD (arguing that telling users to delete their Facebook 
accounts ignores the extent to which the platform is just as inextricable from the lives of many of 
its users as the company fought hard to become). 
57 JIM HARPER & SOLVEIG SIMPLETON, WITH A GRAIN OF SALT: WHAT CONSUMER PRIVACY 
SURVEYS DON’T TELL US 4 (2001), https://perma.cc/8R82-FHW2. 
58 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-768T, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS: USE IS 
WIDESPREAD AND PROTECTIONS VARY 11 (2004) (detailing the range of government benefits that 
require SSN disclosure); Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Online Services for Key Low-Income 
Benefit Programs: What States Provide Online With Respect to SNAP, TANF, Child Care 
Assistance, Medicaid, CHIP, and General Assistance (July 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/EM2F-
U3Q3 (discussing and listing the various state benefit programs with online components). To 
receive unemployment benefits in the state of Maryland, for examples, recipients are able to file 
weekly forms through an online portal, WEBCERT, using their SSN as a username. See Md. Dept. 
of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, Webcert Logon (last visited Sept. 23, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/E74N-AZP5. 
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demonstrate that consumers actively want an Internet supported by 
advertising, which was then used to argue that privacy regulation that 
could hamper advertisers’ pervasive tracking contravened consumers’ 
wishes.59 But the indirect logic here is by design, as the survey’s 
questions provide questions designed to promote a framing of free 
services versus paid services, relying on the inference that if consumers 
prefer not paying for things then they do not value privacy or legal 
protections for it.60 Similar arguments have been posed as to the 
precision of advertising, with industry representatives arguing  that any 
survey demonstrating that consumers value tailored advertisements 
means that they do not support privacy regulation that could hinder that 
targeting in any way.61 The very premise of the question ignores the 
existence of privacy risks engendered by companies collecting 
enormous amounts of data and using it in opaque ways, the ill 
regulation seeks to mitigate. In a world without data breaches, identity 
theft, and information misuse, I share most peoples’s preference for 
free services. But use of a product or service cannot be extrapolated to 
indicate endorsement of its drawbacks, or support for permissive 
                                                          
59 For example, in comments to the Federal Communications Commission arguing against 
implementation of the Commission’s now-defunct broadband privacy rule, Dan Jaffe of the 
Association of National Advertisers argued that the rule would be contrary to the public interest 
as “consumers want, expect, and benefit from interest-based advertising.” See ANA comments, 
supra note 8, at 11. Similarly, Luigi Mastria of the Digital Advertising Alliance cited statistics 
from a 2013 survey conducted by Zogby and DAA as evidence of why consumers do not 
support Internet browsers that block cookies, which are a fundamental component of web 
tracking. Luigi Mastria, Hearing on A Status Update On The Development Of Voluntary Do-
Not-Track Standards Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 113th 
Cong. 9 (April 24, 2013) (statement of Luigi Mastria); Alison M. Cheperdak, Double Trouble: 
Why Two Internet Privacy Enforcement Agencies Are Not Better than One for Business or 
Consumers, 70 FED. COMM. L. J. 261, 294  (2018) (arguing that “[t]he FCC's increased 
regulations will have a negative impact on consumers because most consumers are not opposed 
to sharing information with Internet business in exchange for free or discounted services,” citing 
the 2016 DAA/Zogby survey, see infra note 60 and accompanying text, that reported “[m]ore 
than 85 percent of respondents said they preferred [that] ad-supported Internet model instead of 
paying for online content.”). 
60 DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, ZOGBY ANALYTICS PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON VALUE 
OF THE AD-SUPPORTED INTERNET 5 (May 2016), https://perma.cc/9PM7-9RBT (“Question 11: 
Which of the following would you prefer: an Internet where there are no ads, but you have to 
pay for most content you read/see like blogs, entertainment sites, video content and social 
media, or today’s Internet in which there are ads, but most content is free?”). Unsurprisingly, 
85% answered “an ad-supported Internet where most content is free,” and only 14% opted for “a 
paid Internet where everything cost money because there is no advertising.” Id. at 5 (emphasis 
added). 
61 See, e.g., Daniel Castro, Stricter Privacy Regulations for Online Advertising Will Harm the 
Free Internet, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION (Sept. 2010), 
https://perma.cc/E5VH-8YLC (noting that found that stricter privacy laws in the EU diminished 
the effectiveness of advertising and other evidence to claim “[t]he evidence clearly suggests that 
the tradeoffs of stronger privacy laws result in less free and low-cost content and more spam (i.e. 
unwanted ads) which is not in the interests of most consumers.”). 
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privacy regulation that allows those drawbacks to perpetuate. Other 
surveys have used similar framing devices to elicit responses that seem 
to undermine a public desire for privacy, like another DAA survey that 
asked “[w]ould you support a law that restricted how data is used for 
Internet advertising, but also potentially reduced the availability of free 
content like blogs and video sites online?”62 This provides the evidence 
the study’s funders intend to produce, but contributes no meaningful 
information about the respondents’ actual thoughts on privacy 
legislation. 
The use of deliberately framed survey responses as empirical 
evidence of widespread privacy apathy contributes to broad 
misunderstandings of privacy norms and enables a lax regulatory 
regime when used as ammunition against policy reforms. When an 
individual’s control over their information through notice and choice 
mechanisms is used as a representative illustration of their privacy 
preferences and expectations, it is possible to conclude that the failure 
to exercise that control constitutes a deliberate rejection of privacy. In 
reality, a range of cognitive and structural forces impede the 
individuals’ incentives and abilities to take privacy-protective steps, 
obstacles that tend to be ignored in the rhetorical haste to drive the last 
nail into privacy’s coffin.  
The following sub-parts will detail the structural and cognitive 
limitations that complicate the conclusions of the privacy paradox, and 
illustrate the difficulty of relying on user privacy decision-making (or 
on surveys that ignore the barriers to coherent privacy decision-
making) as a referendum on public privacy preferences or expectations. 
2. Structural Limitations 
The information asymmetry between consumers and data-
collecting entities is perhaps the greatest impediment to delivering 
functional notice or meaningful choice. Consumers do not understand 
how privacy policies are intended to work, and most privacy policies 
fail to effectively convey the information they are intended to provide. 
In many contexts, a company may not even be able to disclose the 
trajectory of where the consumer’s information might travel because it 
does not know what third parties might receive the consumer’s 
information or how they might use it.63 Few people read privacy 
                                                          
62 Interactive Survey of US Adults, DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE (Apr. 2013), 
https://perma.cc/2WHM-G4TW. 
63 Researchers continually discover new ways in which consumer behavior is tracked online; 
activity that is usually unknown to consumers and sometimes unknown to both the consumer 
and the company. See Gunes Acar, Steven Englehardt & Arvind Narayan, No Boundaries for 
User Identities: Web Trackers Exploit Browser Login Managers, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Dec. 
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policies, and those who do are left with little basis to understand the 
uses of their data.64  
 When individuals do take the time to read privacy policies, 
they tend not to understand what they mean. Multiple studies have 
illustrated that most individuals have a tenuous grasp of what a privacy 
policy is actually intended to accomplish.65 In one such study, more 
than half of respondents believed that “[w]hen a company posts a 
privacy policy, it ensures that the company keeps confidential all the 
information it collects on users.”66 The typical privacy policy does 
nothing of the sort, and is designed to provide regulatory cover for the 
data collecting entity as much as it is to inform the user; if anything, 
privacy policies are more accurately described as corporate 
disclaimers, rather than consumer guarantees. As Senator John 
Kennedy memorably described it to Mark Zuckerberg as he testified in 
the Senate, “[t]he purpose of that user agreement is to cover Facebook's 
rear end. It's not to inform your users about their rights … tell your 
$1,200 an hour lawyers … you want it written in English and non-
Swahili, so the average American can understand it. That would be a 
start.”67  In one study that interviewed experts, knowledgeable users, 
                                                          
27, 2017),  https://perma.cc/G6PR-F4QG (explaining “how a long-known vulnerability in 
browsers’ built-in password managers [was] abused by third-party scripts for tracking on more 
than a thousand sites.”); Steven Englehardt, Gunes Acar & Arvind Narayan,  No Boundaries: 
Exfiltration of Personal Data by Session-Replay Scripts, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/R3BZ-PKKD (reporting that when third-party analytics scripts record user 
online behavior such as keystrokes and mouse behavior, “the extent of data collected by these 
services far exceeds user expectations,” particularly when “[t]his data can’t reasonably be 
expected to be kept anonymous.”). See also Steven Englehardt, Gunes Acar & Arvind Narayan, 
Website Operators Are in the Dark about Privacy Violations by Third-Party Scripts, FREEDOM 
TO TINKER (Jan. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/5NJZ-AKLG (discussing the trio’s previous 
research and noting that many websites had no relationship with the third parties exploiting their 
user data, or any idea that the exploitation was occurring). 
64 Solove, supra note 40, at 1884 (citing research demonstrating how few people read privacy 
policies); Martin & Nissenbaum, supra note 48, at 180, n.4 (describing studies that document 
how little consumers understand how their data might be used); Joshua Gluck, Florian Schaub, 
Amy Friedman, Hana Habib, Norman Sadeh, Lorrie Faith Cranor & Yuvraj Agarwal, How 
Short Is Too Short? Implications of Length and Framing on the Effectiveness of Privacy 
Notices, 2016 SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 321, 322 (noting that “It is fairly rare 
for individuals to read a privacy policy in its entirety” due to their complexity and length); 
JOSEPH TUROW, MICHAEL HENNESSY & NORA DRAPER, THE TRADEOFF FALLACY: HOW 
MARKETERS ARE MISREPRESENTING CONSUMERS AND OPENING THEM UP TO EXPLOITATION 8 
(2015), https://perma.cc/WL5V-U5WV (“[S]ome lawyers who write the policies for large 
companies have acknowledged to Joseph Turow that the documents are legal tender not 
designed to be understood by ordinary people.”).  
65 See Turow et al, supra note 64, at 8; Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know 
What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (December 4, 2014) https://perma.cc/9GBK-
H4HM . 
66 See Smith, supra note 65. 
67 Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, supra note 2. 
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and untrained crowd-workers, frequent disagreements emerged 
between the experts regarding the meaning of key terms, as did 
disagreements between the expert consensus and the consensus of the 
crowdsourced workers.68 This demonstrates both the opacity of privacy 
policies generally and their tendency to confuse the average consumer 
–both of which contradict the idea that informational self-
determination through notice and choice reflects an informed decision-
making process. 
That privacy policies are long and difficult to understand prevents 
people from reading them, but shorter policies would likely fail to 
adequately describe the relevant practices a user should know.69 
Privacy policies are given the impossible task of providing information 
that is sufficiently complete, yet perfectly digestible for consumers, 
while fulfilling regulatory requirements.70 Consumers are trapped 
between a rock and a hard place; privacy policies are too long to be 
worth reading, yet they fail to convey relevant information needed to 
make an informed decision. Moreover, they are highly unlikely to 
disappear from how consumer privacy is governed anytime in the near 
future.71 At the same time, poor understanding of the Internet 
ecosystem also engenders misleading survey results.72 
The same lack of understanding of the substance and applicability 
of privacy policies seems to persist in users’ understandings of 
application permissions, corporate data practices, and surveillance 
                                                          
68 See Joel Reidenberg, Travis Breaux, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Brian French, Amanda Grannis, James 
T. Graves, Fei Liu, Aleecia McDonald, Thomas B. Norton, Rohan Ramanath, N. Cameron 
Russell, Norman Sadeh & Florian Schaub, Disagreeable Privacy Polices: Mismatches Between 
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERK. TECH. L. J. 39, 86-87 (2015). See also Cranor, 
supra note 28, at 274 (noting that privacy policies are “long, complicated, full of jargon, and 
change frequently.”). 
69 See generally Gluck et al., supra note 64; Kanthashree Mysore Sathyendra, Shomir Wilson, 
Florian Schaub, Sebastian Zimmeck & Norman Sadeh, Identifying the Provision of Choices in 
Privacy Policy Text, 2017 CONF. ON EMPIRICAL METHODS NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING 2774, 
2774, https://perma.cc/V33S-THRQ (noting that the level of education required to understand the 
average privacy policy is higher than that of the average individual). 
70 Jialiu Lin, Bin Liu, Norman Sadeh & Jason I. Hong, Modeling Users’ Mobile App Privacy 
Preferences: Restoring Usability in a Sea of Permission Settings 2017 CONF. ON EMPIRICAL 
METHODS IN NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING 2774, 2774 (describing the competing requirements 
of privacy policies and the difficulty of simultaneously fulfilling all of them). 
71 See generally Solove, supra note 40, at 1885 (discussing the “fundamental dilemma” of notice). 
72 Turow et al., supra note 64, at 4-5 (reporting widespread misconceptions about advertising, for 
example, “49% of American adults who use the internet believe (incorrectly) that by law a 
supermarket must obtain a person’s permission before selling information about that person’s 
food purchases to other companies,” and that 65% did not know that the statement “[w]hen a 
website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share my information with other websites 
and companies without my permission” is false). See also Tokson, supra note 13, at 179-180 
(distinguishing knowledge polls as less vulnerable to distortion than opinion polls, as they make 
fewer faulty assumptions based on information respondents do not possess). 
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practices. In one study, only 22% of participants understood that 
applications continue to run in the background when the user is not 
directly engaged with them and that an app can still access their 
information when not in use.73 Even when individuals are fully 
informed and take proactive steps to protect their privacy, their actions 
may not have the desired impact. In one example, researchers at 
Princeton demonstrated that when a smartphone user turns off location 
services, her location can still be deduced from other sources of 
publicly-available information.74 Another study demonstrated the 
limited efficacy of popular tracking blockers and browser plug-ins, as 
many users mistakenly believed they had successfully shielded their 
browsing activity.75 And let’s not forget the constant barrage of data 
breaches hitting companies large and small, obviating whatever 
promises those companies made to their users about the privacy or 
security of their information.76 Other companies may employ 
technological workarounds to infer information that their privacy 
policies claim they refrain from collecting, making the disclaimers in 
their privacy policies, should consumers take the time to read them, 
hollow.77 These structural forces – from the lack of consumer 
knowledge about how privacy policies work, to the frequent inability 
of companies to effectively disclose practices outside their control – 
make it all but impossible for consumers to make meaningful decisions 
that exert effective control over their information.78  
                                                          
73 Lynn Tsai, Primal Wijesekera, Joel Reardon, Irwin Reyes, Serge Egelman, David Wagner, 
Nathan Good & Jung-Wei Chen, Turtle Guard: Helping Android Users Apply Contextual Privacy 
Preferences, 148, 2017 SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 145, 148, citing Christopher 
Thompson, Maritza Johnson, Serge Egelman, David Wagner & Jennifer King, When It’s Better 
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2013 SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 1, 3. 
74 Arsalan Mosenia, Xiaoliang Dai, Prateek Mittal & Niraj K. Jha, PinMe: Tracking a Smartphone 
User around the World, 4 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS TRANSACTIONS ON 
MULTI-SCALE COMPUTING SYSTEMS  420, 420 (2017). 
75 William Melicher, Mahmood Sharif, Joshua Tan, Lujo Bauer, Mihai Christodorescu, & Pedro 
Giovanni Leon, (Do Not) Track Me Sometimes: Users’ Contextual Preferences for Web Tracking,  
2016 PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECH. 135, 137, citing Pedro Leon, Blase Ur, Richard Shay, 
Yang Wang, Rebecca Balebako & Lorrie Cranor, Why Johnny Can’t Opt Out: A Usability 
Evaluation of Tools to Limit Online Behavioral Advertising, 2012 CONF. ON HUMAN FACTORS 
COMPUTING SYSTEMS.  
76 See, e.g., Christopher Mele, Data Breaches Keep Happening. So Why Don’t You Do 
Something?, N.Y.T. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/technology/data-
breaches.html (describing the millions of Americans affected by the barrage of hacks and the 
difficulty of both breach response and prevention). 
77 Hoofnagle, supra note 39, at 170, n. 92 (describing “reverse enhancement,” where a data broker 
uses one form of information and other databases to deduce a consumer’s home address). 
78 See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 9 149 (“disclosure is a ritual to be endured”), quoting OMRI 
BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 10 (2014). 
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3. Cognitive Limitations 
While the informational asymmetry discussed presents a baseline 
obstacle to rational privacy decision-making, cognitive limitations also 
skew the process, further preventing privacy behavior from accurately 
reflecting users’ privacy preferences or expectations. The logic of 
notice and choice assumes a baseline consumer rationality in privacy 
decision-making that is rarely, if ever, present79 – and if privacy 
decision-making is not rational, the logic that individuals do not want 
privacy protections because they fail to engage with notice and choice 
is fundamentally unsound.  
 Social scientists and privacy scholars have described the 
cognitive phenomena that impede rational decision-making, such as 
hyperbolic discounting, which posits that people assign a lesser value 
to less ascertainable, far-off rewards, and higher value to rewards that 
are easily acquired.80 In the case of privacy decision-making, when a 
privacy policy is densely opaque, and the possible benefit of preventing 
a hypothetical privacy harm is juxtaposed with the immediate benefit 
of a sales discount or free WiFi, hyperbolic discounting is one of the 
reasons why the overwhelming majority of the population would 
choose the latter.81 The possibility that a snoop might be intercepting 
an individual’s web traffic, and that the traffic could be directly or 
inferentially valuable enough to the snoop to somehow cause her harm, 
seems tenuous and remote compared to the concrete and immediate 
reward of Internet access.  
A similar phenomenon is the idea of bounded rationality, which 
posits that humans are fundamentally limited in the amount of 
information and skills we can harness and apply to a given decision, 
and therefore use simplified metrics and approximations that are 
ultimately unrepresentative, resulting in an irrational outcome.82 
Otherwise put, it contradicts the idea that consumers will generally act 
in a rational way, maximizing utility and their own self-interest at any 
                                                          
79 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 52, at 26. 
80 See generally Solove, supra note 40, 1883; Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 52, at 31.  
81 Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 52, at 31. 
82 Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate 
Gratification, 2004 PROC. ASS’N COMPUTING MACHINERY CONF. ON ELEC. COM. 21, 23; 
Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 52, at 30; Alessandro Acquisti, Idris Adjerid, Rebecca 
Balebako, Laura Brandimarte, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Saranga Komanduri, Pedro Giovanni Leon, 
Norman Sadeh, Florian Schaub, Manya Sleeper, Yang Wang & Shomir Wilson, Nudges for 
Privacy and Security: Understanding and Assisting Users’ Choices Online, 50 ASS’N 
COMPUTING MACHINERY COMPUTING SURVEYS Art. 44, at 2 (2017) (defining bounded 
rationality). 
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given turn.83 Privacy decisions are particularly shaped by bounded 
rationality, as privacy choices are usually abstract and based on 
incomplete information, making a correct mental model of the decision 
all the more difficult to summon. In short, individuals often fail to 
engage in exactly the kind of clear-eyed, conditional thinking upon 
which the conclusion of the privacy paradox depends.84 
Another cognitive phenomenon that affects individual decision-
making is the common difficulty of accurately assessing the impact of 
cumulative risk. A phenomenon that may feel relatable to many readers  
(or at least to the author) occurs when people often discount the 
ultimate danger created by the series of incremental steps that will 
ultimately permit that danger to take place. In conjunction with 
hyperbolic discounting, this means a user is not only favoring the 
immediate reward over the possible risk when assessing a possibly 
privacy-invasive scenario, but failing to correctly ascertain that initial 
risk, even when the decision may not produce a reward. Examples 
include assessing the danger of small decisions like repeatedly using 
unsecured public WiFi networks, or failing to use strong and different 
passwords for a range of different online accounts against the risk of 
identity theft.85 These risks may be even more challenging for 
connected devices where the context of data collection may seem more 
limited, but the possibilities for abuse are not.86 Conversely, while an 
amorphous risk and the value of dignity may be difficult for consumers 
to quantify when assessing a transaction, the data collector faces no 
such difficulty in quantifying the value of consumers’ information.87 
The way that individuals process risk is highly relevant for 
understanding both how notice and choice actually functions, and for 
correctly interpreting surveys that purport to measure which privacy 
risks individuals care about. 
                                                          
83 Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L.  REV. 
843, 899 (2002) (describing bounded rationality and its impact on privacy decision-making). 
84 Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti & George Lowenstein, Misplaced Confidences: 
Privacy and the Control Paradox, 4 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI.  340, 341 (2014). 
85 For another example, see Spencer, supra note 83, at 897. “For a consumer buying an appliance, 
the cost of [providing] her address will probably seem trivial compared to the cost of not buying 
the appliance. Consumers generally make their data-sharing decisions within the framework of 
each incremental transaction in which they participate, while merchants base their practices on 
the realities and economies of scale of the data profiling business.” The risks compound, but each 
transaction creating it does would not alone justify the kind of calculation that the privacy paradox 
would require a “pro-privacy” consumer to make. 
86 Florian Schaub, Bastian Konings & Michael Weber, Context-Adaptive Privacy: Leveraging 
Context Awareness to Support Privacy Decision Making, 14 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC 
ENGINEERS PERVASIVE COMPUTING 34, 34 (2015). 
87 Spencer, supra note 83, at 897-98. 
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Decision fatigue further limits the efficacy of notice and choice. 
Consumers are faced with a constant barrage of privacy decisions, 
which compounds the difficulty of making privacy decisions that suit 
their expectations or preferences. These decisions include reading 
privacy policies, terms of service, checking application permissions, 
and others. As these decisions are nearly constant, a user engaging with 
them in a meaningful way, reading every privacy policy or going to the 
website of every app or IoT device, is not only unlikely but an 
impractical use of one’s time.88 One study famously estimated that it 
would take the average American internet user forty-minutes per day 
on average to read every privacy policy she came across, at a cost of 
$2,533-$5,038 a year.89 Declining to read a privacy policy could be 
attributed to rational ignorance, when a consumer makes an 
economically logical decision not to seek out a sufficient explanation 
about a given scenario, such as deciding to forego the requisite time to 
read a privacy policy that will ultimately fail to effectively convey the 
necessary information anyway.90 To make matters more confusing, 
providing too much control, by providing consumers with exhaustive 
information as to every way in which their data is used and every time 
it is used, can have the paradoxical effect of paralyzing individuals, 
rather than empowering them.91 
The cognitive phenomena and informational asymmetry that 
prevent consumers from making privacy decisions that suit their 
preferences are considerable. But even when consumers are 
knowledgeable about how their information is used, the risks a given 
decision can create, and the basic steps they can take to mitigate those 
risks, consumers still fail to take those mitigating steps due to 
resignation, rather than apathy towards their privacy or an affirmative 
decision to subordinate their privacy preference to another value.92 The 
difference between a person’s privacy preference and their privacy 
expectations can further help diagnose the incoherence between 
commonly expressed privacy preferences and ultimate privacy 
behavior. A person with a preference for privacy acts in the hope that 
her action will protect her information; a person with an expectation of 
                                                          
88 McDonald & Cranor, supra note 41, at 544. 
89 Id. at 563-64. 
90 Tokson, supra note 13, at 167 (defining rational ignorance generally and as a flaw in the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test’s reliance on individual knowledge of privacy and 
technology). 
91 Hartzog, supra note 43, at 975. 
92 Turow et al., supra note 64, at 13, 17 (defining resignation, and reporting that “[T]he more a 
person knows about information collection in the marketing world, the more likely the 
resignation.”). 
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privacy is convinced that it will. The convergence of a strong privacy 
preference, with the conviction that any pro-privacy steps will fail to 
accomplish their stated goal, illustrates a key part of the “paradox”— 
the resignation of the informed consumer.93 “Learned helplessness” 
describes when an individual in a negative situation with no recourse 
to change it accepts the situation as a coping mechanism – lack of 
power to change the cause of the negative circumstance shapes the 
individual’s response to it.94 A study on Americans’ attitudes towards 
online privacy and tradeoffs reported that the majority of those who 
were willing to trade their information for discounts under certain 
scenarios did so resigned to the possible risks, rather than as a rational 
decision weighing privacy, utility, and possible adverse outcomes.95 
The study further reported that those who are the most informed about 
online privacy are the most likely to be resigned to its abuse.96  
When privacy skeptics and motivated industry coalitions use 
flawed methodologies to arrive at desired policy conclusions, their 
evidence appears convincing; it seems that consumers do not actually 
want the privacy protections that regulators would give them, and as 
privacy is a good to barter away rather than a right that must be shielded 
at a basic threshold from certain harms, any privacy enforcement (such 
as a new rule, law, or interpretation of policy) should be heavily 
influenced by those wishes.97 Surely, if consumers will offer their email 
addresses in exchange for the use of public WiFi, they have rationally 
weighed the costs and the benefits of the transaction and concluded that 
they do not want to pay for the services they have grown accustomed 
to receiving for free. To ignore their choice in a free market would seem 
paternalistic and undemocratic.98 And unlike other areas of the law, 
                                                          
93 Id. at 17. 
94 Bloom et al., supra note 47, at 367 (discussing learned helplessness, and remarking that learned 
helplessness could have impacted the response of participants who rated a potentially privacy-
invasive scenario as ‘likely’ who were more likely to be comfortable with that scenario). 
95 Turow et al., supra note 64, at 4, 14 (58% were “resigned” to the misuse of their information, 
and 72% rejected the statement “what companies know about me from my behavior online cannot 
hurt me.”). 
96 Id. at 9. As limiting as anecdotal proof is, this phenomenon seems logical to me, as I write this 
paper on privacy behavior and expectations while connected to the open WiFi network of my bus.  
97 See, e.g., Meredith Kapushion, Hungy, Hungry HIPAA: When Privacy Regulations Go Too Far, 
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1491 (2004) (criticizing HIPAA for not accommodating divergent 
consumer desires for their health data to be monetized). 
98 See, e.g., Adam Thierer, A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis In Digital Privacy Debates, 
20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1068 (2013) (“Paternalistic claims clash mightily with the 
foundational principles of a free society – namely, that individuals are autonomous agents that 
should be left free to make choices for themselves, even when some of those choices strike others 
as unwise . . . .  [A]ssertions that people cannot be trusted to look out for themselves … would 
imply that the benefits of regulation are virtually boundless and that the costs should generally be 
ignored in order to essentially save consumers from their own choices.”). 
2018] Model(ing) Privacy  25 
where stronger guardrails exist to prevent consumers from being 
fleeced by an unconscionable transaction they purportedly want to 
engage in, privacy would seem to present no such countervailing 
concern, with the exception of the most concrete and egregious 
physical and monetary harms. 
But as this article has hopefully begun to demonstrate, these 
arguments depend on a rational privacy decision-making process that 
simply do not exist. Opinion surveys fail to account for the heavy role 
that context plays in privacy decision-making, the lack of information 
most individuals have about the information ecosystem, and the 
cognitive phenomena that impact privacy decision-making that all 
contribute to the fallacy of the informed and rational privacy decision-
maker. Advertising-dependent industries have strong incentives to 
keep privacy as unregulated as possible, and to make motivated 
arguments that a system dependent on a fallacious behavioral model is 
the only possible way to preserve freedom and innovation. Those 
arguments are politically useful, and they’ve often worked. As long as 
consumer privacy is considered to be a good that individuals should 
always have the right to trade away, motivated analysis of flawed 
methodologies will continue to provide support for arguments that 
dress commercial or ideological objectives in democratic clothing. The 
simple fact that someone might answer that they care about their 
privacy in a survey, and yet use public WiFi, will continue to be offered 
as proof that whatever privacy law aims to protect, consumers neither 
need nor want it. 
Introducing new types of privacy research into policymaking will 
not affect the incentives of the stakeholders making those arguments. 
But empirical research that is able to measure privacy preferences, 
expectations, and behavior accurately – by accounting for the context 
of different privacy decisions, the loaded premises behind broad 
questions about complex technology, and the fallacy of the rational 
privacy decision-maker – can help illustrate for regulators and the 
public which policy prescriptions are medicinal, and which are snake 
oil designed to benefit the companies that sell them, in addition to 
illuminating privacy preferences, expectations and behaviors that are 
often difficult to discern. 
Of course, the possibility remains that when individuals make 
decisions that do not prioritize privacy, they are simply prioritizing 
other values such as increased convenience, functionality, or a good or 
service.  Not every privacy decision is an indictment of the notice and 
choice system. Like most goods, the value of privacy in a given 
circumstance is finite; like most rights, it is rarely absolute. But for that 
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assessment to be accurate, it must be based on informed and 
meaningful privacy decision-making which, due to the cognitive and 
structural limitations discussed above, rarely exists in practice.99 
Asserting that decision-making under these circumstances reflects a 
free and informed choice is a facile distortion of how real people think 
and act, and should be repudiated when used as evidence of popular 
enthusiasm for permissive privacy regulation. For the use of notice and 
choice to provide a remotely faithful snapshot of individual privacy 
preferences and expectations – and for empirical research to do the 
same – the barriers to coherent decision-making must be fully 
accounted for.100 
B. The Fourth Amendment 
Whereas social science is often poorly used in consumer privacy 
legal and policy discussions, it is rarely used to inform assessments of 
a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 
Regulators and legislators ask the public for input on how they should 
approach privacy issues, which creates a space for research to answer 
their questions: judges usually do not. In both areas, government 
decision-makers struggle to discern privacy norms that they need to 
understand in order to interpret or create the law – evaluating what 
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment has proven particularly challenging in the case of 
emerging technology.101  
As a baseline, the Constitution protects privacy from government 
intrusion in the Fourth Amendment, which states that the government 
must obtain a warrant based on probable cause before searching or 
seizing persons, papers, places, or effects.102 This has been interpreted 
through subsequent cases to mean that the government must obtain a 
warrant in order to search or seize something in which a person has a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society would deem objectively 
                                                          
99 See, e.g., Turow et al., supra note 64, at 16 (finding that most Americans don’t have the basic 
knowledge to make informed cost-benefit choices). 
100 Id. at 3 (“Marketers justify their data-collection practices with the notion of tradeoffs, depicting 
an informed public that understands the opportunities and costs of giving up its data and makes 
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to policymakers and the media that Americans accept widespread tracking of their backgrounds, 
behaviors, and lifestyles across devices, even though surveys repeatedly show they object to these 
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101 See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 476, 481 (2011), 
102 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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reasonable, unless a warrant exception applies.103 While there have 
been a few landmark cases that have recognized the need for new 
rules,104 most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is hamstrung by 
doctrinal principles that far predate the technology to which the 
principle is applied, resulting in outcomes that undermine the 
underlying values of the Amendment.105 While a common law system 
necessarily requires extending old principles to new facts, judges have 
to be able to accurately assess societal norms, which they are rarely 
positioned to be able to do well.106 Fourth Amendment protections end 
up being tied to the reasonable judge’s expectation of privacy, not the 
reasonable person’s. The result is a similar mismatch of what legal 
doctrine presupposes and how human beings actually think and act.  
1. Analog Doctrines 
One aspect of why evaluating a modern reasonable expectation of 
privacy is so difficult is that technology has outpaced the applicability 
of the logic supporting many Fourth Amendment doctrines, creating 
the need for new rules that will uphold, rather than contravene, the 
privacy protections the Constitution is intended to confer. 
Perhaps the most glaring instance of a blunt Fourth Amendment 
standard that fails to account for the categorically disruptive impact of 
new technology is the third-party doctrine. This is the idea that by 
entrusting information to a third party, the sender extinguishes her 
expectation of privacy in the information. The doctrine originally 
developed in two cases, United States v. Miller, and Smith v. Maryland, 
                                                          
103 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Riley v. California, 
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483-84 (2014) (describing Fourth Amendment exceptions). See also Slobogin 
& Schumacher, supra note 11, at 731 (describing the evolution of the “societal understanding” of 
privacy norms as a function of the Katz test). 
104 See e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (holding that a cell phone is not a container for search incident 
to arrest purposes, and that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to search one); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40-41 (2001) (holding that a search of the home using a device that is 
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despite the fact that they were stored on a third-party server). 
105 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The 
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remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner?)” 
(citations omitted)). 
106 Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 649 (2013) 
(describing the flaws of binary Fourth Amendment doctrines and arguing that a context-based 
approach can provide a more accurate descriptive measure of privacy norms, as well as a more 
coherent structure to judicial analysis of Fourth Amendment cases). 
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involving the privacy interest in the routing numbers sent to the 
defendant’s bank, and the privacy interest in the phone numbers sent to 
the defendant’s phone company respectively.107 But in the digital age, 
it is essentially impossible to communicate without entrusting a range 
of information to digital service providers. Sending a text message 
requires the cell phone’s signal to be collected by the nearest cell tower, 
and for a smart phone, often to a provider of cloud storage services as 
well. The use of email or the Internet requires routing traffic through 
an Internet service provider.108 The mulishly bifurcated reasoning of 
the third-party doctrine creates a scenario where a text message cannot 
contain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the situation where a 
folded paper note would because in application the doctrine fails to 
consider the context separating various new applications. 
Other tenets of Fourth Amendment doctrine are subject to similar 
critique. The automobile exception provides that under most 
circumstances, a police officer does not require a warrant to search a 
vehicle. This logic is  predicated on the exigency concern of searching 
a mobile entity, as well as the idea that the pervasive regulation of 
automobiles undermines a reasonable expectation of privacy in one.109 
It is also about as binary a standard as they come – the degree of 
mobility of an entity does not control whether it is considered a 
“vehicle” for the purposes of the exception, including cases like an 
immobile trailer.110 But the vast majority of vehicles are now equipped 
with GPS, such that the vehicle keeps a careful record of the drivers’ 
location history. Infotainment systems also allow drivers to sync the 
contact information in their cellphones, or the information from 
intelligent assistant devices located in their homes, an area that is 
afforded the strongest possible Fourth Amendment protections.111 This 
categorically changes the privacy interests involved in searching a 
                                                          
107 United States v. Miller 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-
44 (1979). 
108 See generally Aaron Rieke, David Robinson & Harlan Yu, What ISPs Can See, UPTURN 
(March 2016), https://perma.cc/T5TZ-KDBM. 
109 See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (“Even in cases where an automobile was 
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vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.”). 
110 See United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 499 (2d Cir. 2010). 
111 Erin Biba, How Connected Car Tech Is Eroding Personal Privacy, BBC (Aug. 9, 2016), 
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vehicle,112 and could not have been taken into account in the case that 
established the exception in 1925.113  
Another blunt standard rendered inapt by technology is the 
content/non-content distinction, a line of jurisprudence that holds that 
unlike the content of communications, related “non-content” 
information associated with the communications have no Fourth 
Amendment privacy interest.114 This distinction arose through a series 
of cases, starting with Ex parte Jackson, which distinguished the 
contents of a letter from the information on its envelope,115 and was 
established more fully in Smith, which distinguished the contents of a 
telephone conversation from the telephone numbers dialed by the 
caller.116 The content/non-content distinction is also present in the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA), a law designed to limit the 
government’s access to the electronic information held by network 
intermediaries.117 The statute requires the government to seek a warrant 
for the contents of electronic communications, but permits it to obtain 
“records or other information pertaining to a subscriber” on the basis 
of a subpoena showing that there are “reasonable grounds” that the 
information is “relevant and material” to the investigation.118 The 
binary distinction is determinative here; content requires a warrant 
while non-content does not. However, subscriber information, 
customer records, and other non-content can be far more revealing that 
the distinction implies, particularly in aggregate.119 Metadata – “data 
                                                          
112 Lindsey Barrett, supra note 24, at 194 (arguing that the privacy implications of the data 
collected by connected cars and automated vehicle undermine the logic of the Fourth 
Amendment’s automobile exception, such that a warrant should be required to search vehicle 
data). 
113 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
114 See, e.g., Paula Kift & Helen Nissenbaum, Metadata in Context – An Ontological and 
Normative Analysis of the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection Program, 13 I/S: J. L. & 
POL’Y FOR INFO SOC’Y 333, 372 (2017) (“[T]he main assumption underlying the NSA’s 
justification for the bulk telephony metadata collection program – namely, that metadata is 
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115 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). 
116 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). 
117 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).  
118 Id. § 2703(d). 
119 Ian Samuel, The New Writs of Assistance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.  2873, 2892 (2018) (noting 
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enormous amounts of sensitive information about the users of network services,” such as personal 
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information); William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under 
the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L. J. 1195, 1208 (2010) (noting that for both electronic 
communications service providers and remote communications service providers, the two types 
of service providers subject to the SCA, “personal identifying information about the user such as 
her name, physical or e-mail addresses, and IP address, is entitled to little protection”). See also 
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about data,” like the size of a Microsoft word document, the location a 
text was sent from, or the time stamp on an email120 –  constitutes non-
content, and can thus be acquired by the police on a standard akin to 
reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, by virtue of that designation. 
Yet metadata itself can be tremendously revealing, in addition to the 
fact that it creates structured datasets that are relatively easy for 
computers to analyze.121 
The Fourth Amendment’s forced binary of the public/private 
distinction is another example of a blunt test that ignores the 
transformative impact of technology on the facts driving older 
doctrines and differences of modern expectations.122 The public view 
doctrine provides that there is no expectation of privacy in something  
public, such as marijuana plants on private property visible from a low-
flying airplane.123 However, there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information so difficult to obtain that law enforcement must 
use technology that is not in “general public use” to perceive it.124 Here, 
too, the distinctions are more nuanced than that rule might suggest. In 
United States v. Knotts, when the police attached a tracking device to 
the defendants’ vehicle, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy 
that merited a warrant, as the defendants’ movements were in public.125 
Though a later GPS tracking case was decided on the basis of the 
trespass, two concurrences questioned the warrantless invasion of 
privacy that was permitted by twenty-eight days of tracking a vehicle, 
regardless of the fact the movements were public.126 The prodigious 
spread of public surveillance technologies, such as drones, CCTVs, 
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automated license plate readers, and facial recognition databases have 
further eroded the public-private distinction.127  
2. The Reasonable Judge’s Expectation of Privacy 
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of coalescing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine with the realities of technology is that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test requires a judge to determine 
what privacy norms are, a difficult task that they are poorly equipped 
to do.128 Studies attempting to provide empirical answers for what 
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy have found that the 
norms that judges rely on in their cases often contradict the norms 
reported by average individuals.129 For example, in United States v. 
Forrester, the Ninth Circuit found that there was no expectation of 
privacy in the websites a person visits or the email addresses with 
which they correspond, analogizing to the phone numbers dialed in 
Smith.130 The court reasoned that on the basis of assumption of the risk, 
and the distinction between content (the email) and non-content (the 
address whence it was sent), there was no privacy interest protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, and to whatever extent there was, the 
defendant repudiated it by trusting a third party, the service provider. 
This would likely surprise the majority of individuals who think that a 
warrant should be required to access the email addresses they have 
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a reasonable person would feel free to terminate an encounter with the police). 
130 United States v. Forrester, 512 F. 3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2007).  
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corresponded with, contradicting the basis for the third-party doctrine 
(and the holding of Forrester).131  
The survey also reported other ways in which judges tend to hold 
different perspectives from the average person that are likely to impact 
their understanding of reasonable expectations of privacy. In contrast 
with the holding of Knotts and other cases that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy for movements in the public view, only 24% of 
respondents would find warrantless GPS surveillance of their 
movements for more than ten days to be acceptable.132 Most people 
also believe they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in both GPS 
and CSLI, despite frequent judicial insistence that the emission of such 
information is both knowing and voluntary.133 Justice Gorsuch 
underlined the divergence of doctrine and popular perception in his 
Carpenter dissent, highlighting research that most people distinguish 
between invasions of privacy for more serious crimes over more minor 
ones, whereas Fourth Amendment doctrine does not.134 
In a comprehensive treatment on the subject of knowledge and the 
Fourth Amendment, Matthew Tokson documents a number of ways in 
which judges tend to overestimate the average person’s understanding 
of online privacy and government surveillance.135 While courts have 
held that users understand how ISPs operate and how email is sent, 
erroneous understandings of the internet ecosystem abound (such as 
the 61% of respondents in a Consumer Reports survey who believed 
that what they do online is never shared without their permission).136 
Courts have used the existence of privacy policies to determine that 
users were aware of the privacy interests they gave up, when for a range 
of reasons, most users neither read nor understand the privacy 
policies.137 In all fairness to judges, rapidly shifting norms regarding 
privacy and technology make a reasonable expectation of privacy 
difficult for anyone to deduce, as this article has indicated. 
Nevertheless, the space between what the reasonable judge expects and 
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what the reasonable defendant expects undermines the very premise of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test – that it is possible for a judge 
to correctly discern societal privacy norms and adjudicate defendants’ 
Constitutional claims accordingly.  
II. THE ROLE OF CONTEXT 
An important thread unifying the flaws in consumer and criminal 
privacy governance is widespread failure to sufficiently account for the 
role of context in how individuals consider a given privacy scenario. 
Context greatly impacts how individuals consider privacy decisions, 
from deciding to skip over a privacy policy to sending an incriminating 
letter or email. It also changes the value and accuracy of opinion survey 
results, depending on whether the survey questions take into account 
how differently people think about their privacy under different 
circumstances. Privacy decisions tend to be the product of a wide range 
of factors, such as the relationship between the discloser and the 
recipient, perceived risk of disclosure, the location of the disclosure, 
and the information disclosed, as well as the cognitive factors that 
might affect a given decision.  
The bedrock theory asserting the relationship between context and 
privacy is Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity, which 
states that the key to effectively evaluating privacy norms and creating 
rules that adhere to individual expectations must consider the context 
of a given flow of information.138 She defines privacy as the 
appropriate flow of personal information, rather than a right to secrecy, 
obscurity, or control.139 What is appropriate in a given scenario is 
defined as adherence to informational norms, which are measured by 
the contextual integrity framework. A privacy event is analyzed on two 
levels, normative and descriptive.140 For the descriptive layer, the 
privacy scenario is broken down into four basic elements – actors, 
contexts, attribute (type of information), and transmission principles.141 
If the norm described by the scenario does not conform with 
established norms of appropriate information flows, the normative 
layer analyzes the change to determine the social and moral impact, 
and whether the new norm would better serve the underlying values 
and objectives of the social context.142 
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Contextual integrity builds on a historical and philosophical 
acknowledgment that in their day-to-day lives, a person often occupies 
multiple roles and exists in different spheres and contexts; no man is a 
monolith, and our expectations, decisions, and behavior are shaped by 
the particular sphere in which our actions occur.143 By breaking a 
privacy decision down to its constitutive elements, it is possible to trace 
the individualized factors that impact a given privacy decision, such as 
cognitive limitations, the source of the information, or the environment 
in which the decision is made. Contextual analysis provides the nuance 
that an accurate evaluation of norms demands, rather than the clunky 
conjecture presumed by the privacy paradox.144 
In consumer privacy law, this could mean evaluating the 
contextual factors – such as type of data collected, the identity of the 
collector, the reason for collection, the location of the collection – to 
consider why the consumer made the choices she made. The context of 
privacy decision-making could also be considered more broadly to 
encompass not just the circumstances of the decision, but additional 
factors, such as the cognitive limitations that shape decision-making 
and informational asymmetries. In criminal law, this means both 
evaluating the impact of various contextual factors in a given privacy 
scenario (the kind of information, the recipient, and so forth), but also 
evaluating the impact of the new contextual factors that the use of 
technology introduces to old doctrines (for instance, how the real time 
dossier of your movements created by a cell phone is distinguishable 
from the markings on a physical envelope). What changes about the 
circumstances of a privacy action when a transmission of information 
is in a written letter, as opposed to an email? Courts would say that 
while a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a list of the 
people she corresponded with through the mail, the same is not true for 
the email addresses, as the emails passed through an Internet service 
provider.145 The majority of the population would likely feel 
differently.146 
Understanding privacy norms within their underlying context is 
an enormously important part of interpreting them accurately. Analysis 
of a person’s privacy decision-making cannot be mindlessly 
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extrapolated beyond the circumstances that created it, particularly 
when that analysis would shape the development of future law or 
trigger the liability of existing ones. Trading your ability to shield your 
location from an application may be worth an hour of free WiFi; but 
this is a fact-contingent calculation, which must be considered in light 
of the factual circumstances that shape it. More accurate research on 
privacy norms could enable policymakers to counter the sweeping 
assertions based on conjectural tautology with a more systematized 
approach, based on empirical evidence of the contextual expectations 
and preferences that privacy critics so often purport to be able to divine. 
III. EMPIRICAL PRIVACY RESEARCH 
To better understand privacy norms, judges and policymakers 
need to understand the inherent limitations impacting privacy decision-
making, and to examine the context surrounding those choices at a 
more granular level than they currently do. Empirical research already 
informs consumer privacy policymaking, but different forms of 
research that address the role of context, considers the cognitive and 
practical limitations of privacy decision-making, and differentiates 
among privacy preferences, expectations, and behavior will provide 
more accurate insights for policymakers than opinion surveys that 
ignore the impact of context on how individuals consider privacy 
decisions, or assume the existence of a perfectly informed, 
economically rational decision-maker. Empirical research that attempts 
to account for the flaws in how we currently measure privacy norms in 
law and policy, such as cognitive limitations and information 
asymmetries, can guide judges and policymakers in their application of 
current law and shape the development of better ones in the future. In 
some cases, empirical research may assist consumers in making 
privacy choices that adhere to their expectations, such as through 
managing the volume of decisions or the way privacy policies are 
worded. A more granular analysis of privacy decision-making can help 
explain the divergence between stated privacy preferences and privacy 
behavior that blunter standards fail to grasp. Careful, detailed analysis 
can serve as a critical counterpoint to the facile argument that the 
contradictions between privacy preference and observed behavior 
compel the conclusion that the preference is meaningless, or a 
deliberate repudiation of the preference. 
Much of the new research exploring these ideas relies on various 
artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, such as the use of machine 
learning to create a predictive model of privacy norms or guiding a 
user’s choices according to their previous ones. General AI, the hazy 
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finish line of omnipotent, human-level cognition that has driven the 
research field for decades, is an unknown distance from current 
capabilities – an omniscient Skynet that can seamlessly manage our 
privacy concerns for us remains the stuff of science fiction.147 But 
narrow AI, autonomous or semi-autonomous processes that can 
complete tasks within a certain scope, such as image or voice 
recognition, has been steadily and rapidly improving, and has the 
potential to help coalesce blunt privacy standards with the realities of 
multi-dimensional privacy decision-making.148 Various types of AI are 
differentiated by the type of logic they employ to accomplish a given 
task.149 Machine learning algorithms improve through iteration on a set 
of training data, and then based on the connections between features in 
the data, designate their own rules for classifying a given input.150 
Natural language processing refers to a host of machine-learning 
techniques that interpret text using statistical inference or the use of 
neural networks, which are inspired by the knowledge trajectory 
framework of the human neural system.151 While not generally 
considered a form of artificial intelligence, another technique that has 
been often used in tandem with AI-focused privacy research is 
crowdsourcing, which uses human expertise, such as crowd-workers 
answering survey questions or labeling training data, to expand what 
automated processes can accomplish.152 Current examples include 
Wikipedia, which is driven by the information provided by human 
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editors, or the Amazon Mechanical Turk system, which provides 
access to human participants for a given task (such as answering survey 
questions) in exchange for a small fee.153 Crowdsourcing provides a 
relatively rich and inexpensive source of data to populate the training 
sets computer scientists can then use to train predictive models. 
The value of this new empirical privacy research is that it can 
provide a more accurate basis for privacy law and policy by explaining 
why people make the privacy decisions they make, after taking into 
account decision-making flaws, the impact of context, and the 
distinctions between preferences, expectations, and behavior. While 
opinion surveys have been a common tool of privacy law and policy, 
they often fail to capture a complete picture, fueling anti-privacy 
narratives like the privacy paradox’s conclusion that anti-privacy 
actions must speak louder than pro-privacy words. For example, in a 
recent paper, Helen Nissenbaum and Kirsten Martin dissect the 
methodology of privacy opinion surveys, and demonstrate how the fact 
that individuals modulate their privacy behavior to contextual factors 
contradicts previous results that fueled the narrative of the privacy 
paradox.154 But research that designs around the flaws of past 
methodologies may be able to eclipse those failures, such as more 
granular opinion surveys, or methodologies that measure behavior 
directly. In addition, crowdsourcing can be used to facilitate broader 
opinion surveys. When trying to ascertain a descriptive understanding 
of existing norms – for example, whether most people on average 
would assume that they have an expectation of privacy in their cell site 
location information – opinion surveys are still enormously valuable, 
and crowdsourcing may assist in expanding their reach, particularly as 
response rates for traditional landline phone surveys continue to 
plummet, impacting the quality of the available data.155 Surveys are not 
inherently flawed as a methodology, provided they do not rely on the 
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same misplaced assumptions about privacy that have characterized 
previous ones, such as conflating preferences and expectations, 
assuming the respondent is deeply informed about the internet 
ecosystem, or divorcing broad privacy value statements from 
situational context. Instead, these new methods acknowledge the limits 
of asking someone broad questions about how they value their privacy 
writ large. They also design around the prior flaws of previous survey 
methods by focusing on the context of privacy decisions and parsing 
the kinds of decisions being made in a given scenario (whether a true 
preference, a resigned expectation, or an action impacted by lack of 
information or decision fatigue).  
I have divided the current research into descriptive research, the 
primary objective of which is to provide accurate information on 
privacy expectations and norms; and operative tools, which are 
designed to spur user privacy behavior that is more consistent with user 
expectations. Many of these studies fall into both categories, such as 
algorithms that model user preferences in order to provide an operative 
tool,156 or a project focused on using semi-automation to streamline 
reading privacy policies, which intends to observe trends in common 
mismatches between policy commitments and user expectations.157 
The taxonomy is for simplicity. 
A. Descriptive Research 
Descriptive empirical privacy research – research that uses a 
range of methods to isolate the factors that impact individual privacy 
preferences and expectations, as well as illustrating broader norms – 
could be enormously helpful for policymakers and judges as they 
attempt to better understand the inconsistencies and ambiguities of 
modern privacy behavior and beliefs. 
In a recent paper, a group of researchers from New York 
University and Princeton University used crowdsourcing  and other 
methods to automate the discovery of privacy norms.158 The 
researchers used Helen Nissenbaum’s five-element contextual integrity 
framework – sender, subject, attribute, recipient, transmission principle 
– to capture norms that applied to variations of scenarios in an 
educational setting.159 They automatically generated 1,411 questions 
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using the framework, where a given question might be the following: 
“Is it acceptable for the Professor (sender) to share the student 
(subject)’s grades (attribute) with the class (recipient) with the 
student’s permission (transmission principle)?”160 The participants 
could respond with “yes,” “no,” or “does not make sense” (to remove 
the automatically generated scenarios that would be unlikely to occur 
in the real world, such as a student sending a teacher a TA’s grades).161 
The researchers developed three metrics to gauge how the survey group 
perceived a given question; a norm-approval score, a use-approval 
score, and a divergence score.162 The first score measures whether a 
norm was approved by the respondents, such as a 50% or 66% overall 
approval score. The second measures how many norms were approved 
by a given respondent, and the third measures the variance of one 
respondent’s answers from the answers of all the others – i.e., their 
dissatisfaction with the established norm.163 The researchers then 
encoded the privacy norms established by the respondents’ answers 
into formal logic and used automated theorem provers to check the 
norms for semantic and transitive consistency.164 One widely approved 
norm was a professor sending graduate schools a student’s attendance, 
with her permission; a widely disapproved norm was a TA sending the 
class a student’s grades if the student was performing poorly.165  
The researchers were thus able discover population consensus 
about a range of privacy interactions, and test the strength, stability, 
and consistency of the norms established. They also note that, having 
derived a method for encoding norms that reflect broad consensus 
about privacy into formal logic, the framework they built could be 
amplified through the use of machine learning.166 Namely, having 
created the formal framework to capture and express granular privacy 
norms in a way that can be used to train a predictive model, that model 
could predict additional norms involving different scenarios –  such as 
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what consumers think about a particular type of tracking an agency is 
considering regulating, or how people distinguish among different 
kinds of sensitive information that are sent through a third-party service 
provider.  
Another study at the University of California, Irvine built on 
similar ideas. The researchers built a machine-learning model to 
predict participants’ future privacy preferences based on participants’ 
reactions to various privacy scenarios in real time involving a 
connected device.167 The researchers developed an app for Google 
Glass where the glasses would display a given IoT scenario based on 
the participant’s location, and he or she would then respond to 
corresponding survey questions about their preferred privacy outcomes 
in the app. Similar to the contextual integrity framework, the questions 
broke down a privacy interaction into contextual parameters – where 
the monitoring occurs, what is monitored, who is monitoring, why the 
monitoring is taking place, and the frequency of the monitoring. They 
also asked about participants’ desire to be notified, their willingness to 
accept the monitoring, and their level of comfort, associated risk, and 
appropriateness of the monitoring involved.168  Having the participants 
answer questions at the locations they were being asked to evaluate 
through projecting the scenarios onto Google Glass has the added value 
of giving participants a more realistic and less abstract reminder of how 
they might truly react to each scenario in the real world. 
 Results included a range of preferences, such as the fact that 
participants would not allow videotaping of their movements without 
a clear purpose, and that they found still photography to be relatively 
more acceptable, but were still concerned about still photography with 
a purpose if the purpose is to determine a specific characteristic.169 
Monitoring for safety or social reasons (such as a service 
recommending a friend) was considered invasive, whereas monitoring 
for health purposes was more likely to be deemed acceptable.170 The 
researchers then used a clustering algorithm to determine the impact of 
the different contextual factors (such as location, basis for monitoring, 
and so forth), and trained a machine learning classifier on the survey 
responses to predict user privacy preferences based on context (where, 
what, who, the reason for monitoring, and the persistence thereof).171 
The model was 77% accurate in predicting a binary privacy decision 
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(simply accepting the monitoring or rejecting it), and the researchers’ 
use of an interpretable method of machine learning meant that they 
could determine why the model made the decisions it did.172  
Another study also examined privacy preference modeling for 
IoT. The researchers used crowdsourcing to show participants context-
based privacy vignettes design to measure the impact of eight factors 
on privacy decisions – type of data collected, the location where the 
data was collected, whether the user benefits from the data collection, 
the device that collects the data, the purpose of collection, retention 
time, whether the data is shared, and whether additional information 
could be inferred.173 After being shown the vignette, participants were 
asked them how often they would want their phones to notify them 
about that type of collection, how comfortable they were with that data 
collection, and whether they would allow or deny the collection.174 The 
researchers then used statistical regression to determine the 
significance of various factors, and used the data to train two machine-
learning models, one to predict the individual’s comfort level with a 
particular data collection scenario, and the other to predict what the 
individual’s ultimate decision to allow or deny data collection would 
be.175 The researchers were thus able to analyze which factors were the 
most influential for both comfort level and ultimate data collection 
decision.176 As comfort level and collection decision were separate 
prediction models, the researchers could parse when comfort level and 
desire to permit or deny collection were distinct, and found that a high 
comfort level for a given collection scenario did not always mean that 
the user would choose to have their data collected in that scenario, if 
given the choice.177 The study also found that users were more likely 
to accept collection when their data was being put to “beneficial” use, 
either for their own personal benefit, or for the “greater good.”178 The 
collection decision and comfort level models were 76-80%179 and 81% 
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accurate, respectively.180 These results are helpful for separating the 
factors and result of privacy decision-making that are often assumed, 
as well as illuminating which ones are more important than others. 
B. Operative Research 
Other researchers have focused on using different artificial 
intelligence techniques to guide user behavior in a more privacy-
protective way, such as through providing the information necessary 
for coherent privacy decision-making in a more understandable form, 
or by mitigating the effects of decision fatigue and other cognitive 
phenomena. This includes different approaches to streamlining the 
process of reading privacy policies, and modeling user preferences to 
build predictive algorithms that nudge the user’s privacy decisions 
accordingly. 
One group investing considerable efforts towards researching and 
building privacy-protective user tools is the Useable Privacy Project, 
an ongoing research collaboration at Carnegie Mellon University.181 
One aspect of their work focuses on developing techniques using 
natural language processing, crowdsourcing, and machine learning to 
automate (or semi-automate) the process of reading a privacy policy, 
in order to provide users with better information, mitigate the cognitive 
biases that hinder privacy decision-making, and build a database of 
privacy policy trends to illustrate where expectation mismatches are 
most prevalent, what common policy clauses are the most misleading 
for readers, and other impediments to coherent privacy decision-
making.182 In one study, the researchers examined the mismatch 
between users’ privacy expectations online, and what the privacy 
policy of a given website actually permitted the company to do.183 The 
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researchers similarly found that a range of highly contextual factors 
impacted what participants’ expectations were and why, including 
website type (health, financial, or dictionary) and user characteristics – 
things like privacy knowledge, privacy concept familiarity, age, 
whether or not the participant had an account with the website, or had 
used it recently.184 Isolating the instances where privacy policies are 
the most likely to contravene privacy expectations could be 
enormously helpful in reducing decision fatigue in users, by 
highlighting only the portions of a given policy that they will need to 
read.185 
 In another study, another group of researchers built a classifier to 
automatically locate provisions of choice in privacy policies, such as 
the ability of the user to opt out of collection by clicking on a URL in 
the policy.186 As opting out is a concrete, effective action the user can 
take, it is one of the more significant aspects to tease from a dense 
privacy policy and bring to the user’s attention.187 Highlighting the 
most important aspects of privacy decision-making for users, such as 
when they can opt out, prevents them from sapping their mental energy 
on cognitive tasks that are less important for their privacy choices, such 
as reading an entire privacy policy when actually reading it is unlikely 
to sway the user’s decision to use the service. The ultimate goal would 
be to create a browser plug-in that would identify opt-out hyperlinks to 
the user.188 The researchers also relied on manual annotation of privacy 
policies to build logic representations for future automation, and 
crowdsourced annotations to train a machine-learning classifier to 
identify when a policy would be clear to human users.189 Another 
project, Polisis, uses natural language processing and neural-network 
classifiers to power a browser plug-in that breaks down the privacy 
policy of a given website for the user.190 
In yet another study, researchers at the University of California, 
Berkeley used machine learning to predict how a user would respond 
to a privacy decision – namely, an application permission request – to 
predict their response to another privacy decision.191 The researchers 
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first measured the difference in accuracy of the user’s decision, 
(whether the permission granted or denied corresponded with the user’s 
expressed preference, when compared with what the privacy policy 
accomplishes) when users were given the permissions decision on first 
using the app, rather than on first installing it.192 The idea here was that 
an ask-on-first-use permission would be made when the user had 
greater context for the decision, rather than at the moment the user 
downloaded the app.193 The hypothesis appeared correct, as the ask-on-
first-use decisions were 84% accurate, while the ask-on-first-install 
decisions were 25% accurate.194 They then built a classifier that 
incorporates passively observed information relating to the individual’s 
privacy preferences (behavioral information, responses to runtime 
information, and responses to permissions requests195), and reports the 
prediction and a confidence score, which would determine whether or 
not the user was prompted to confirm the preference selected by the 
algorithm.196 The researchers’ goal was to eliminate the volume of 
decisions a user has to make in addition to aligning the decisions more 
closely with the user’s stated preferences.197 By using past decision 
history and other information, the algorithm could infer when the 
privacy decision was aberrant from decisions the person made in the 
past, and automatically make the decisions where the algorithm 
reported a high confidence in its prediction.198 This prevents the user 
from being overwhelmed with low-impact choices she is unlikely to 
care about, while preventing her lack of information from skewing the 
choice she made, and still giving her the opportunity to make the harder 
choices that she would want to make herself. 
In a similar experiment, researchers tested an Android 
permissions manager, Turtleguard, which balanced the dual objectives 
of grounding each privacy decision in context and while preventing the 
user from being overwhelmed by the volume of decisions she needs to 
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make.199 Turtleguard uses a classifier to respond to the permissions 
request based on whether the requesting application was actually being 
used at the time of the request, which the researchers found was a 
reliable indicator of whether participants thought a permission request 
was invasive or not.200 These decisions are logged in the Turtleguard 
portal, and can be audited by the user to calibrate the classifier for 
future requests. Another study trained a classifier to discern when a 
user would be comfortable being tracked by an advertiser, based on the 
properties of the web page, the user’s demographics, and attitude 
towards tracking.201 While this study was preliminary and on a smaller 
scale, it demonstrates another area in which users display finely-
grained, contextual reasons for the privacy decisions they make, and 
that those reasons can be inferred and used by an algorithm to finesse 
privacy decision-making.  
Together, these studies point to the possibility of using empirical 
methods to gain new insights into privacy preferences, expectations, 
behaviors, and norms, and the factors that influence each. Modeling 
crowdsourced norms, like the studies using contextual integrity 
vignettes202 or the research on IoT preference modeling,203 can be 
enormously helpful in eliciting why people make the privacy decisions 
they do. Contextual modeling could be used as a baseline to map the 
average reasonable person’s expectation of privacy in a range of 
scenarios, particularly in cases of emerging technology where judges 
or regulators have a limited basis of comparison. With machine 
learning, studies that prioritize explainable methods – such as the study 
that used clustering to identify important factors on participants’ 
privacy perceptions,204 or the study that isolated comfort level and 
desire to permit tracking205 – can help illustrate for regulators what 
kinds of practices users generally consider deceptive or unfair.206 
Proactive tools, like semi-automated privacy policy annotations and 
nudging privacy assistants, can help counteract problems like 
information asymmetry and decision fatigue, and empower users to 
make coherent privacy decisions that suit their expectations. In turn, 
tools that better enable individuals to make privacy choices that reflect 
their preferences will ideally help researchers and regulators to more 
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accurately infer privacy preference preferences and expectations from 
their privacy behavior. An ideal world isn’t the one in which we happen 
to live, but absent an overhaul of the entire notice and choice system, 
creative tools that help counteract the flaws of the user control model 
can at least help users in their seemingly impossible quest to obtain 
effective notice and meaningful choice. The following section will 
detail how both operative and descriptive research can be implemented 
and incentivized in the development and application of privacy law. 
IV. APPLICATIONS 
The value of empirical research in privacy law and policymaking 
would, appropriately enough, depend on the context in which it is used. 
Courts, regulatory agencies, and legislatures have different legal, 
practical, and philosophical limitations on the kinds of evidence that 
they can rely on as the basis for decision-making. Due to the different 
roles and histories of these institutions, policymakers’ reactions to the 
value of empirical research will depend on their role, and consequently, 
so will the viability of these proposals.207 The following section will 
discuss the value of different types of empirical privacy research for 
different areas of privacy law and policy. 
A. Descriptive Research & Fourth Amendment 
Modeling crowdsourced norms could provide a more accurate and 
empirical counterpoint to the privacy expectations that judges attempt 
to approximate, as well as demonstrate the instances when the 
implications of new technology diverge sharply enough from the 
logical underpinnings of precedent to merit a new approach. Many 
scholars have called for judges to anchor their legally determinative 
assessments of societal facts in empiricism, particularly in Fourth 
Amendment cases.208 In one of the earliest such appeals, Christopher 
Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher conducted a survey of 217 people to 
determine how the average person actually perceives encounters that 
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implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy, and ultimately 
discovered a wide range of situations where the doctrine reflected 
assumptions contrary to the norms participants reported, particularly a 
lower expectation of privacy in a range of scenarios.209 Lior Strahilevitz 
has advocated for the reasonable expectation of privacy in tort cases to 
consider an empirical evaluation of how information travels through 
social networks, ideally providing a sense of how likely certain 
information was to be made public based on the structure of the 
network and cultural variables.210 Paul Ohm proposed that equilibrium 
adjustment theory be anchored in statistical measurements of how 
technology has shifted the balance between observer and observed, 
such as through the length of investigations, or number of 
indictments.211 Andrew Ferguson has observed that location-based 
predictive policing algorithms could produce empirical data on what 
makes an area “high-crime” for Fourth Amendment purposes, possibly 
reducing the ability of the capacious term to be used as a stand-in for 
disadvantaged or minority neighborhoods.212 Perhaps the most relevant 
to the present analysis is Matthew Tokson’s empirical examination of 
the role of knowledge in the reasonable expectation of privacy test, in 
which he argues that anchoring the test to individual or societal 
knowledge fundamentally prevents the Fourth Amendment from 
evolving in step with technology.213 Empirical research on the kinds of 
throwaway assumptions that often guide a judge’s decision in a Fourth 
Amendment case – such as how common a certain kind of search is, or 
under what circumstances most people would feel able to terminate an 
encounter with the police – could play an enormous role in anchoring 
amorphous, norm-based questions to facts, a crucial development when 
radical technological developments make those norms difficult to 
gauge, and quick to shift.  
Empirical research can also be used to render the fuzzy judicial 
approximations of privacy more accurate, as most judges are limited in 
their understanding of what the expectations of the “average” person 
are.214 Generalized assumptions that judges may hold about societal 
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norms are narrowed by the range of experiences they themselves have 
held, which typically do not reflect the experience of the defendants 
before them.215 To give a recent example, in the oral arguments for 
Carpenter v. United States, Justice Kennedy inquired as to how well 
the average individual knows what the retention and access policies of 
a cell service provider are, joking that “if I know [that a cell phone 
company has my data], everyone does.”216 The Justice was attempting 
to poke fun at himself by indicating that if someone as technologically 
unsavvy as himself is aware of cell phone company practices, the rest 
of the population must be. But in reality, the converse is more often 
true; a judge’s experience is, unsurprisingly, more often a higher bar 
than that of the average person. The judiciary is older, more urban, 
better-educated and wealthier than most of the population,217 and this 
demographic skew likely has a correspondingly transformative effect 
on how judges conceptualize what “reasonable” is, as they are more 
likely to be aware of surveillance practices than defendants, and 
unlikely to recognize that their perspective is unrepresentative.218 
Indeed, Tokson’s study found that the majority of cell phone users do 
not know that their location is being tracked and collected, and 15% 
believed that no collection occurs at all.219 
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Analyzing his 810-person survey on individuals’ understanding 
of cell phone tracking, Tokson notes that the average person’s 
knowledge of cell phone tracking is substantially less than what judges 
have ruled it is, and the average person’s expectation of privacy in that 
information is higher.220 Analyzing the results against past judicial 
holdings on societal expectations of privacy, he further concluded that 
while judges are frequently correct in ruling on the doctrinal perception 
of privacy norms, they tend to underestimate what most people actually 
expect, and overestimate what they actually know.221 Judges have no 
problem applying the standards the way the law instructs; but the law 
relies on the idea that the judge’s perception of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is fungible with that of the average defendant, 
which is rarely the case. Another study also found that that community 
consensus on privacy expectations frequently diverged starkly from 
Supreme Court precedent.222  
A judge’s bias about a given defendant’s role in society may also 
skew outcomes. Avani Mehta Sood has noted that motivated cognition, 
the unconscious human tendency to reason towards preferred 
outcomes, may affect judicial applications of the exclusionary rule in 
Fourth Amendment cases.223 For example, he found that while in an 
experiment using lay participants the severity of the crime decreased 
the likelihood that the participants would allow the information to be 
suppressed.224 In testing that hypothesis on judges themselves, he also 
discovered that some may be conscious of motivated cognition and 
attempt to mitigate to its effects, while others are simply susceptible to 
the phenomenon.225 Using a contextual framework to model 
informational norms can provide judges with a source of accurate data 
beyond their own experience for what norms are widely accepted by 
society, rather than what norms are widely accepted by judges.  
In addition to providing judges with a more accurate perception 
of what the average reasonable expectation of privacy actually is, 
context-based modeling can also balance Fourth Amendment values in 
a way that is faithful to the principles of the precedent, while 
accounting for the decisive impact of new technology. Andrew Selbst 
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has argued for a contextual-integrity-based approach to Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, arguing that Nissenbaum’s theory of appropriate 
information flows is better-equipped to respond to the shifting, 
granular privacy expectations of the modern reasonable person in the 
digital age.226 While this article does not go quite so far as to propose 
replacing Fourth Amendment analysis with contextual integrity 
altogether, Selbst’s prescient proposal demonstrates the value of 
contextual integrity to a Fourth Amendment inquiry, as well as the role 
that context-based modeling could play in making blunt legal tests 
coalesce with the realities of technological norms. Nissenbaum herself 
has also applied the contextual integrity framework to the Fourth 
Amendment context, arguing that the Fourth Amendment doctrines 
concerning metadata – namely, the content/non-content distinction, the 
public view doctrine, and the third-party doctrine – violate contextual 
integrity because technology has disrupted the original information 
flow in a way that is normatively undesirable.227  
Crucially, context-based models like contextual integrity are 
deliberately flexible enough to capture the full range of interests that 
the Fourth Amendment is intended to measure, beyond merely the 
weight of the privacy expectation being assessed and whether that 
expectation would be deemed valid by society.228 The range of 
scenarios can capture the full spectrum of interests that Fourth 
Amendment tests are intended to balance, including when warrantless 
search or seizure implicates a lesser privacy interest (such as consent 
searches,229 or evidence in plain view230), or where the governmental 
prerogative is greater (such as search incident to arrest,231 national 
security,232 or heightened danger233) while still providing a more 
accurate report of what privacy expectations are reasonable.  
Carpenter demonstrates how valuable contextual modeling could 
be to help judges assess nuanced privacy norms, particularly as the 
chasm between the limits of what Fourth Amendment principles 
purport to protect and what the doctrine actually covers is continually 
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widened by technological change.234 The Court held that the collection 
of more than seven days’ worth of CSLI by the government without a 
probable-cause warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, given the 
revealing nature of the information.235 The majority “declined to 
extend” Smith and Miller to CSLI, while leaving the third party 
doctrine untouched, if marked for death, as it pertains to any other 
information beyond the  seven-days’ worth of CSLI at issue in 
Carpenter.236 But determining exactly how different types of 
information that seem to implicate the same kinds of privacy concerns 
as CSLI should be considered will be a difficult and fact-intensive task 
for judges. As Justice Kennedy raised in his dissent, the majority’s 
basis for requiring a warrant does not provide much clarity as to what 
distinguishes the sensitivity of CSLI from financial information held 
by digital intermediaries, for one example.237 Chief Justice Roberts 
claimed that however it is that the Court must assess what constitutes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, its lodestars of seeking to secure 
“the privacies of life” against “arbitrary power” and “plac[ing] 
obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance”238 must 
mean that the Constitution requires the government to obtain a warrant 
before it can access “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” 
geolocation information.239   
But how will judges distinguish which other information passed 
through a third party (that is, any information transmitted over the 
internet or through any kind of digital service provider) provides the 
“intimate window into a person’s life” that the majority held CSLI 
specifically provides?240 Fitbit data that shows a person’s sleep cycle 
or sexual habits, transactions on a financial app like Venmo, the times 
of day that a person adjusts the smart thermostat in their bedroom –  
each of these could implicate the “familial, political, professional, 
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religious, and sexual”241 associations that the majority felt warranted 
protection for CSLI but is not directly tied to geolocation, and thus 
excluded from Carpenter’s new warrant requirement. The ability of the 
government to obtain information about a suspect in hindsight as 
opposed to the need to surveil prospectively is the same for this kind of 
non-geolocational data, and it is similarly cheap for companies or law 
enforcement to gather and store.242 It is exactly here that contextual 
modeling could be useful to help judges identify which kinds of 
information presents particularly sensitive privacy concerns for the 
average person. Variations of different scenarios could be modeled just 
as the researchers modeled education privacy vignettes in the NYU and 
Princeton study.243 While Chief Justice Roberts describes the case as 
deciding “only that a warrant is required in the rare case where the 
suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third 
party,”244 given how much information passes through third parties by 
default and how much of that information can implicate the legitimate 
interests that the Chief Justice himself cites, distinguishing when 
individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy will be a 
difficult, finnicky task. Context-based modeling could be invaluable in 
capturing the privacy norms that have left the assumptions of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine far behind, and which judges can struggle to 
discern.245  
Descriptive research on privacy norms can also impact how 
searches and seizures are conducted before a case is even brought. The 
Office of Legal Policy in the Department of Justice issues guidance to 
federal law enforcement and component prosecutors about its policy 
views on certain matters, such as whether there are sensible reasons not 
to pursue enforcement in certain areas, or only under certain 
conditions.246 For example, the Department issued guidance in 2015 on 
the use of cell site simulators, directing federal agents to acquire a 
warrant before a simulator is used, despite the fact that existing 
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precedent did not clearly require them to do so.247 The Attorney 
General releases memoranda to United States attorneys recommending 
approaches and prosecutorial tools, and the office also testifies to 
Congress on its recommendations.248 Empirical research on privacy 
norms could inform such recommendations, and have a far-reaching 
impact on how searches and seizures are conducted—and defended—
on the ground, impacting cases before they reach the courtroom, or 
preventing them from being filed at all. 
Of course, the use of empirical modeling would never determine 
what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in lieu of a judge. 
Even if legal or practicable, such a solution would require a blithe faith 
in the perfectibility of technology that past mistakes have repeatedly 
proven to be misguided. But using contextual modeling to examine 
areas where the juxtaposition of new technology with analog precedent 
has made the average reasonable expectation of privacy difficult to 
discern can lend some basis of empirical accuracy to broad judicial 
assessments of protean technological norms. While the Supreme Court 
is typically loath to overturn precedent, they have been known to do so 
when technology distorts the applicability of existing precedent to a 
sufficient extent.249 It is also important to acknowledge the uphill battle 
that proposals to incorporate empirical approaches to judicial decision-
making often face. Judges are typically leery to rely on “legislative 
facts,” or factual determinations that are the product of the real world 
and may inform the legal determinations in a case.250 This is often for 
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good reason, as without sufficient support from fact-finding entities or 
unbiased experts, they may rely on those facts to their detriment, and 
to the detriment of the development of precedent based on accurate 
conclusions.251 Some judges seem even more leery to rely on legislative 
facts resulting from social science in particular.252 However, the broad 
distrust of fact formed outside of the record is necessarily limiting. 
Judges cannot be expected to be a one-stop shop for all given 
information, particularly in cases involving complex technologies.253 
Others have further noted that reliance on empirical evidence has 
previously played a key role in Fourth Amendment and other cases, 
and that both members of the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
acknowledged its potential.254  
It should also be noted that the value of using contextual modeling 
to discern what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy depends 
on the rule governing how that question should be evaluated⎯a rule 
that the Supreme Court has yet to categorically provide.255 While an in-
depth treatment of the issue is outside the scope of this article, it does 
assume that a judge’s understanding of what the average person 
                                                          
251 See Ryan Gabrielson, It’s a Fact: Supreme Court Errors Aren’t Hard to Find, PROPUBLICA, 
(Oct. 17, 2017) https://perma.cc/7BSH-KQU4. 
252 See Luna, supra note 215 at 848-49 (noting that “[t]he Court has shown no inclination to take 
a more empirically grounded approach to the preliminary question of search and seizure analysis”) 
(citing Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 11, at 761); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, ASA President 
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva Responds to Chief Justice John Roberts, AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N 
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discrimination in the workplace”). But see Simon, supra note 214, at 937-38 (discussing the 
backlash to the sociological basis for Brown v. Board of Education, and arguing for the value, and 
possibility of, a sociological approach to the Fourth Amendment). 
253 See generally Larsen, supra note 250 (discussing the breadth of highly technical areas that 
general subject-matter courts are compelled to decide and proposing solutions to bridge that gap 
of expertise).  
254 See Carpenter Empirical Brief, supra note 133, at 12. 
255 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , No. 16-402, slip op. at 5-6 (U.S. June 22, 
2018) (noting that “no single rubric definitively resolves which expectations of privacy are 
entitled to protection.”); id. slip op at 7 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), (“We don’t even know what 
[Katz’s] ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test is. Is it supposed to pose an empirical question 
(what privacy expectations do people actually have) or a normative one (what expectations should 
they have)? Either way brings problems.”) (emphasis in original).  See also, Orin S. Kerr, Four 
Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 503-4 (2007) (stating that “no 
one seems to know what makes an expectation of privacy constitutionally ‘reasonable,’” that the 
Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused to offer a single test,” and arguing that the Court 
alternatively relies on one or more of four possible models, a flexibility from which the 
jurisprudence benefits); Chao et al., supra note 13, at 273-75 (arguing for a reasonableness test 
predicated on “ordinary beliefs,” and discussing past scholarship and cases that have supported 
the same). 
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believes a reasonable expectation of privacy to be is relevant to how 
the test should be implemented. Under that assumption, the more 
accurate a judge’s understanding of the average person’s expectations 
is, the more likely future Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will avoid 
decisions that make sense to esteemed legal scholars, but contravene 
the expectations of the majority of the population, upon which the 
doctrine purports to depend.  
B. Descriptive Research & Consumer Privacy 
The idea that empirically-driven determinations can spur better 
policymaking and regulation is also not a new concept in consumer 
privacy law, or in regulation more generally. For example, the 
Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking was established by a 
bipartisan law in 2016, and seeks to “develop a strategy for increasing 
the availability and use of data in order to build evidence about 
government programs.”256 The Commission released a report of its 
findings in September of 2017, outlining strategies to improve the way 
data is collected at all levels of the government, and used to support 
evidence-based decision-making at all levels of authority.257 The report 
is remarkably comprehensive in surveying the history of evidence-
based policymaking in the federal government, the development of 
applicable laws governing government collection and use of data and 
statistics, and how evidence-based policymaking is currently 
implemented.258 The Commission also emphasized that its 
recommendations concerning data collection must necessarily be 
accompanied by strong privacy protections and transparency 
requirements for the data collected.259 Other recommendations 
included recommending that Congress and the President direct federal 
departments to develop long-term learning agendas to support the 
generation and use of evidence, having the Office of Management and 
Budget coordinate evidence-building efforts across departments, and 
securing sufficient research for the same.260 Adoption of the 
Commission’s recommendations to improve data collection practices 
and implement broader use of evidence in policymaking would be an 
                                                          
256About CEP, COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING (Jul. 10, 2017), 
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257 COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING: THE PROMISE OF EVIDENCE-BASED 
POLICYMAKING 1-3 (2017) (hereinafter Evidence-Based Policymaking Report). 
258 See id. at 13-15. 
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260 See id. at 5. 
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integral part of isolating the lapses in current privacy standards, and 
discovering new ways to correct them. 
Some laws directly depend on a policymaker’s assessment of 
particular privacy norms, for which modeling can provide a more 
accurate portrait. For example, the Safety Act requires that motor 
vehicle safety standards be ‘practicable,’ which includes that there is 
sufficient public acceptance of the technology proposed by the agency 
such that wide adoption is possible.261 As vehicles increasingly 
incorporate connected features and the development and testing of 
automatic vehicles continues to accelerate, vehicle privacy is likely a 
relevant consideration to future safety requirements that the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration adopts. The agency noted in its 
analysis that quelling public concerns about vehicle privacy and 
cybersecurity would be necessary for public acceptance.262 
Crowdsourcing and machine learning techniques could provide a more 
accurate and nuanced basis for determining what the public will in fact 
accept.263 
Empirical research on privacy expectations and preferences 
already shapes FTC policy guidance and enforcement priorities, and 
both a heavier emphasis on its value, and incorporating more effective 
forms of research, can better inform those initiatives. The contours of 
the FTC’s analysis under its deception authority, the aspect the agency 
most broadly relies on in privacy enforcement,264 makes understanding 
consumer motivations and norms an important form of inquiry for the 
agency. When investigating whether a business practice is deceptive, 
the FTC requires that the practice be likely to mislead the consumer, 
then analyzes how that practice would be perceived from a consumer 
acting reasonably under the circumstances, and whether the conduct in 
question was material.265 The first two prongs in particular require FTC 
staff to understand how a consumer thinks when she engages in a 
                                                          
261 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DOT HS 812 014, VEHICLE-TO-
VEHICLE COMMUNICATIONS: READINESS OF V2V TECHNOLOGY FOR APPLICATION 53 (2014) 
(noting that in Pac. Legal Found. v. Dept. of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1345-46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979), the D.C. Circuit held that public acceptance is one of the criteria for 
practicability, one of the factors the agency must demonstrate have met in requiring new safety 
standards under the Safety Act); Stephen P. Wood, Jesse Chang, Thomas Healy & John Wood, 
The Potential Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1457 (citing same opinion, and concluding “[t]hus, as a part of the agency’s 
considerations, a standard issued by the agency will not be considered practicable if the 
technologies installed pursuant to the standard are so unpopular that there is no assurance of 
sufficient public cooperation to meet the safety need that the standard seeks to address”). 
262 See Nat’t Highway Traffic Safety Administration, supra note 261, at 133-35. 
263 See id. at 133-34 
264 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 41, at 599. 
265 FED. TRADE COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION 1 (Oct. 14, 1983). 
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privacy transaction with a company, and whether or not their decision-
making process is reasonable in light of a range of factors, including 
societal norms.266 Using surveys to understand consumer norms is 
nothing new for the agency, which already conducts surveys on 
consumer attitudes on various topics, using the results to “better 
understand how consumers perceive statements or representations 
made to them by businesses,” and to help the FTC develop appropriate 
policy guidance and enforcement strategies.267  
The agency should sharpen its focus on empirical privacy research 
and incorporate these new kinds of research that may be more effective 
at capturing nuanced privacy norms than opinion surveys alone. 
Modeling privacy behavior and norms may be particularly helpful for 
informing agency policy guidance, such as which novel practices 
consumers might be the most likely to consider invasive.268  Empirical 
research on consumer preferences, expectations, and behaviors could 
also be invaluable in agency rulemakings, both in terms of providing 
substantive information to regulators as they consider how to shape a 
new policy, and to populate a robust record to avoid challenges that a 
new privacy rule or policy was created on the basis of insufficient 
information or demonstration of privacy concern from the public.269 
This research can also play an important role in “soft law” policy 
guidance, which helps shape industry practice in areas where few 
concrete laws may appear to apply with clear certainty, such as with 
emerging technology.270 In such guidance, the FTC could report the 
results of the privacy norms of the studies it and others conduct on 
                                                          
266 See Hoofnagle, supra note 39, at 123-25; JEF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING: 
BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LEGAL CONCEPT 14-16 (2010) (describing how the FTC has interpreted 
how to apply the deception standard to a range of consumer standards, from “unthinking” to 
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267 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR FTC CONSUMER SURVEYS 2 (Aug. 
2018) (hereinafter Privacy Impact Assessment). See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT, 
AN EXPLORATION OF CONSUMERS’ ADVERTISING RECOGNITION IN THE CONTEXTS OF SEARCH 
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attitudes regarding native advertising); Hoofnagle, supra note 39, at 124 (describing how the 
agency determines whether a claim was misleading in implied representation cases, and noting 
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268 See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 9, at 149-150. 
269 See, e.g., ANA Comments, supra note 8, at 9 (arguing that the basis the FCC offered for the 
broadband privacy rule, that it is justified to materially advance an interest in protecting the 
privacy of customer information as the vast majority of adults deem it important to control who 
can get information about them, and the number of data-collecting entities continues to grow and 
puts them at risk of information misuse, was not sufficiently proven in the record). 
270 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 41, at 625-26 (noting that while FTC policy guidance 
materials “may not be exactly akin to advisory opinions, but they can come quite close. 
Companies take the guidance in these materials seriously,” and comparing their effect on shaping 
conduct to dicta in judicial opinions). 
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privacy norms and behavior, and address how the insights gleaned from 
them can be incorporated into industry practice.271 In addition to the 
cues that FTC guidance provides to industry, it can also shape the 
enforcement authorities of state and local consumer agencies, further 
facilitating the potential impact of any steps it takes to promote this 
kind of research and the use of its findings.272  
The FTC is also well-equipped to conduct empirical privacy 
research. As the de facto US data protection agency, the Commission 
has both the authority and the imperative to share its technical expertise 
and insight on specific policy areas with relevant stakeholders, 
including industry, consumer advocates, consumers themselves, and 
other agencies. Its role in shaping privacy practices will only continue 
to grow as a range of industries increasingly involve technology, 
particularly as the agencies that have never needed institutional 
expertise in privacy find themselves in need of exactly that.273 
Empirical research on privacy norms is germane to the FTC’s 
institutional role, and can have a decisive impact in shaping privacy 
policy as the FTC guides the policymaking of other enforcement 
bodies.  
The relevant questions of the role empirical research may play in 
a policymaker’s decision-making is perhaps the easiest to answer for a 
legislative body. In terms of the traditional sense of institutional 
parameters, as the branch with the most popular accountability, the 
legislature is least constrained in its prerogative to rely on certain kinds 
of evidence over others. Congress may overrule court decisions with 
which it disagrees, and it has done so, such as with the passage of the 
                                                          
271 See Privacy Impact Assessment,  supra note 267, at 2 (describing how the Commission uses 
surveys to shape enforcement and mold policy guidance for industry). 
272 Danielle Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
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273 For example, the FTC has recently collaborated with the Department of Education, on student 
privacy. See Student Privacy and Ed Tech, FTC (Dec. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/3D3Q-YCZ2. 
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connected cars. See FTC, NHTSA Workshop to Focus on Privacy, Security Issues Related to 
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Releases New Guidance for Developers of Health Apps, FTC (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/KQK7-2AL3. The Commission has been repeatedly invoked as privacy 
guarantor in ongoing debates about broadband privacy. See Press Release, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 
Statement of FCC Chairman Ajit Pai on Congressional Resolution of Disapproval of FCC 
Broadband Privacy Regulations (Mar. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/A36V-UHFU. The agency’s 
expertise will likely only continue to be needed as technology becomes relevant to the sectoral 
domains of other agencies. 
2018] Model(ing) Privacy  59 
1934 Communications Act in response to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Olmstead,274 or the passage of the Wiretap Act275 in response to 
Katz.276 That same accountability makes them subject to public 
pressure, particularly when public pressure comes in the form of 
special interest groups with a heavy incentive to sway a legislator’s 
perception of what the public wants.277 Congress can and should 
incentivize further research and remove existing barriers, but the 
likelihood that research on privacy norms will impact the position of 
any legislator not already predisposed to believe its findings is slim at 
best. That said, members of both the House and Senate have shown 
interest in the both the benefits and risks of artificial intelligence,278 and 
privacy writ large is even more of an established issue on the Hill.279 
Reviving Congress’s Office of Technological Assessment could be a 
helpful step towards enabling the Hill to tackle nuanced issues of 
privacy and technology,280 though it would not in and of itself affect 
the underlying incentives and pressures from lobbying that have 
prevented the majoritarian branch from legislating stronger privacy 
protections,281 giving more resources to the FTC, or any of the other 
measures that Congress could accomplish to spur this kind of research. 
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Transportation. The House contains similar coalitions, like the Digital Commerce and Consumer 
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The technical agencies are ultimately the best positioned to conduct 
and incentivize empirical privacy research, and the most likely to be in 
a position where their efforts will have any observable effects. 
C. Consumer Privacy & Operative Tools 
The ideal objective of descriptive research is to provide more 
accurate information on privacy expectations, preferences, and norms 
to guide the enforcement of current laws, and the development of future 
ones. In contrast, operative tools aim to transform user behavior under 
the existing rules shaping user behavior, rather than necessarily 
transforming the application of current rules. However, tools that guide 
how users interact with privacy-invasive technology may have the most 
immediate effect on privacy behavior. Tools like browser extensions 
that flag aberrant privacy policies, smart privacy assistants, or 
permissions managers can accomplish the concrete work of accounting 
for notice and choice’s deficiencies, and ideally restore some degree of 
meaningful control and choice to the user.  
The federal government should support and incentivize this kind 
of user-centric privacy research. In some areas, it may be appropriate 
for policy to be responsive to the development of user-friendly tools, 
such as requiring some degree of uniformity in privacy policies , such 
that they can be machine-readable.282 Agencies can lend visibility to 
researchers through workshops and conferences, providing grants to 
allow these studies to be expanded upon and replicated, or even simply 
encouraging the pursuit of such research through outreach.283 During 
the Obama administration, the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy established the National Privacy Research Strategy, 
which created objectives for federally-funded privacy research, and 
provided guidance to agencies on how to further promote privacy 
research.284 Even further, the adoption of the proposals made in the 
Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission report would spur 
research in the private sector, such as adopting a centralized process 
through which researchers could apply to receive access to non-public 
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government data.285 The spread of proactive tools like permissions 
managers and browser extensions can only help improve the ultimate 
goal of these efforts: to ensure that users are actually informed about 
their privacy choices and that their privacy preferences are actually 
respected by the entities collecting and profiting from their 
information. 
V. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
The narrow applications of AI discussed in this paper are 
particularly well-suited to the task of improving our understanding of 
privacy expectations and norms. Classifiers that can deduce and 
incorporate granular contextual data can help illustrate the factors 
behind why an individual makes a given privacy decision, and models 
that include feedback and auditing mechanisms can adapt as 
preferences evolve.286 Natural language processing can be used to 
automate analysis of privacy policies,287 demonstrating trends in 
widely used provisions and terms that may be hampering the ability of 
users to make the decisions that suit their preferences. Non-AI 
empirical approaches, such as crowdsourcing, can be used to amplify 
these techniques and to deduce consensus on broader informational 
norms.288  
Not all of the research suggested here requires the use of AI. The 
educational privacy contextual modeling study conducted by the NYU 
and Princeton researches illustrated that its results could be amplified 
by using machine learning to predict additional norms, but the study 
simply relied on crowdsourcing to produce the norms themselves.289 
Other methods could rely on statistical regression, or other analytical 
methods that prioritize comprehension. The focus of this article is on 
empirical techniques that can either enhance the value of existing 
methods of privacy research (fundamentally, crowdsourcing can be 
understood as a different method of conducting an opinion survey), or 
support new approaches that will shed light on the discordance between 
privacy preferences, expectations, and behavior. Not all of these will 
rely on AI, nor will the particular value of a given study necessarily 
stem from the use of AI.  
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It will also be enormously important that the limits of this research 
are carefully considered and understood. In extrapolating any 
conclusions from quantitative findings, it is crucial to consider what 
data was collected and interpreted, but also what data was not. Data is 
not found, but made.290 A model that analyzes user behavior within a 
certain context may be idiosyncratic to that context. Not all privacy 
interests can be quantified or quantified accurately. Beyond the 
constraints of what evidence policymakers may legally rely on, and 
what various threads of political philosophy dictate that they should 
rely on, there are also the factual constraints shaping how AI modeling 
can be used. Modeled norms will need to be reliable, replicable, and 
representative of the populations they are intended to model. 
In the case of individual modeling, researchers should endeavor 
to consider how built-in limitations of their experiments might prevent 
their results from being fully representative. For instance, one of the 
studies measured user behavior on apps that would not lose 
functionality if permission settings were denied, so that the researchers 
could capture user ideal behavior – preferences, as opposed to either 
expectations or resulting tradeoffs.291 Further research and modeling 
would have to be careful to distinguish measuring user expectations 
from users’ likely response when confronted with a conflict, such as 
loss of functionality, and apply the results of their research accordingly. 
In each of the studies described, the researchers noted the limits of 
population size and skew, and how possible it may be to generalize 
their results. Any research conducted should be scrupulously careful to 
avoid any bias in sampled groups. Without a careful approach to 
ensuring that the data used does in fact reflect a range of demographic 
groups, the objective that such a project will seek to accomplish – 
providing consumer privacy regulators or judges with a more accurate 
understanding of primary norms – will fail and create new systematic 
bias in its wake. In the case of crowdsourcing methods, researchers 
must be careful to avoid issues of self-selection bias relating to the 
population of crowdsourced workers used.292 In particular, Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, a crowdsourcing platform used by a wide variety of 
researchers including some discussed here, has been subject to a range 
of critiques about the population of crowdsourced workers it 
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provides.293 Most studies of mobile systems are conducted on non-IOS 
systems, which may limit the applications of those findings.294  
Different areas of privacy will also present different practical 
obstacles for experimental design, such as working with children. 
Researchers have applied the contextual integrity framework to 
examining how children understand online privacy, but given the legal 
and ethical concerns of working with children, the survey responses 
were gathered through in-person interviews as opposed to gathering 
responses online.295 The FTC noted in a 2018 Privacy Impact 
Assessment for FTC Consumer Surveys that the agency does not 
normally conduct surveys of children under the age of 13, though if it 
did, COPPA would govern the agency’s collection and use of the 
information.296 Other contexts may pose similar limitations (or 
prohibitions) for using crowdsourcing and other methods. The legal 
regime constraining how certain information can be used, such as 
health information, will also often restrain research. Any kind of 
research that relies on collecting and processing data must also 
anticipate how to protect it. Operative tools that collect contextual data 
to improve privacy decision-making invite the privacy risks of the very 
data it collects, which private researchers must consider in how their 
tools are constructed.297 Descriptive research conducted by the 
government must also be held to strong standards of privacy protection 
of the information gathered and created.298 Fundamentally, proponents 
of empirical policy solutions must be carefully attentive that new 
techniques do not create new problems as they solve old ones: research 
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methodology that produces transparent, reliable results that are capable 
of replication is absolutely crucial. 
CONCLUSION 
A quickly evolving world demands reflective attention to how 
legal standards have withstood the pressure of novel threats. In 
consumer privacy law, the notice and choice regime rests on the idea 
that consumers are empowered to make rational privacy decisions that 
will exert control over their information, and that failure to do so is a 
rejection of privacy, not a failure of the privacy decision-making 
process or of the legal mechanisms designed to protect it. In Fourth 
Amendment law, blunt standards like the third-party doctrine and the 
content/non-content distinction demonstrate how new contextual 
factors created by new technology have changed the principles 
undergirding those rules, while judges fail to glean what the average 
person’s expectation of privacy actually is. New capacities for 
surveillance and artificial intelligence seem to only further erode a 
dying structure, making the prognosis all the more grim.  
But just as technology may threaten privacy, it may also provide 
the capacity to illustrate weaknesses in our current thinking, and 
prevent future mistakes. Proactive privacy tools can nudge consumers 
into decision-making that better reflects their preferences, and which 
will provide a better portrait of what privacy norms really are. 
Contextual modeling can provide policymakers with a clearer portrait 
of the questions they have struggled to answer since the invention of 
the personal computer: why, exactly, do people care about privacy, and 
how should that answer shape the privacy protections offered by the 
law? Empirical research may not provide that answer definitively 
anytime soon, if ever – but it may be able to guide policymakers to 
reach estimations that are more accurate than their own conjecture, and 
inform the development of more effective and accurate policies around 
privacy norms and decision-making.  
  
 
